University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

2015

Corporate Speech & the First Amendment:
History, Data, and Implications
John C. Coates IV

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Coates IV, John C., "Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications" (2015). Constitutional Commentary.
546.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/546

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

COATES_FINAL DRAFT III (DO NOT DELETE)

7/8/2015 10:50 AM

CORPORATE SPEECH & THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: HISTORY, DATA, AND
IMPLICATIONS
John C. Coates IV∗
This Article draws on empirical analysis of court decisions,
history, and economic theory (a) to show that corporations have
begun to displace individuals as the direct beneficiaries of the
First Amendment, a shift from individual to business First
Amendment cases is recent but accelerating, and (b) to outline an
argument that such cases typically reflect a form of socially
wasteful rent seeking—not only bad law and bad politics, but also
increasingly bad for business and society. Basic facts about
corporations in history are reviewed, regulation of commercial
speech in U.S. history is summarized, and the emergence of the
First Amendment in case law is retold, with an emphasis on the
role of constitutional entrepreneur Justice Lewis Powell
prompting the Supreme Court to invent corporate speech rights.
The chronology shows that First Amendment doctrine long postdated pervasive regulation of commercial speech, which long predated the rise of the U.S. as the world’s leading economic power—
a chronology with implications for originalists, and for policy
analysis of the value of commercial speech rights. The Article
then analyzes Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals decisions to
1
quantify what others have noted qualitatively: corporations have
∗ John F. Cogan Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. Thanks
for helpful discussions—but no blame for the contents of this paper—should go to John
Bonifaz, Ben Clements, Jeff Clements, Clarke Cooper, Ron Fein, Jill Hasday, Vicki
Jackson, Geoff Stone, Ava Scheibler, Leo Strine, Mark Tushnet, and to participants at the
legal symposium on “Advancing a New Jurisprudence for American Self-Government and
Democracy, co-sponsored by Harvard Law School and Free Speech For People on Nov. 7,
2014, and at a “Last Lecture” at Harvard Law School on February 11, 2015. Any errors are
mine. For disclosure of financial interests potentially relevant to this Article, see Faculty
Disclosures re: Related Outside Interests and Activities, HARV. L. SCH. [http://perma.cc
/TTH6-LNFE].
1. See, e.g., Thomas Jackson & John Jefferies, Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Frederick Schauer, First
Amendment Opportunism, in LEE C. BOLLINGER & GEOFFREY R. STONE, EDS.,
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174–97 (2002); TAMARA

223

COATES_FINAL DRAFT III (DO NOT DELETE)

224

7/8/2015 10:50 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:223

increasingly displaced individuals as direct beneficiaries of First
Amendment rights, they have done so recently, but with growing
2
3
speed since Virginia Pharmacy (1976), Bellotti (1978), and
4
Central Hudson (1980). Nearly half of First Amendment legal
challenges now benefit business corporations and trade groups,
rather than other kinds of organizations or individuals. Such cases
represent examples of a particular kind of corruption, defined
here as a form of rent seeking: the use of legal tools by business
managers in specific cases to entrench reregulation in their
personal interests at the expense of shareholders, consumers, and
employees, and in aggregate to degrade the rule of law by
rendering law less predictable, general and clear. This corruption
not only risks the loss of a republican form of government
emphasized by most critics of Citizens United, but also risks
economic harms – a package of risks one could call (with some
but only some exaggeration) “the risk of Russia.”
I. SOME HISTORY
In this Part, I review basic historical facts at the intersection
of constitutional, business, and corporate law. Nothing in this
section is news – except that business and corporate scholars may
not be aware of the details of the constitutional history, and
constitutional scholars may not be aware of the details of the
business and corporate legal history. This Part of the Article thus
represents an effort at improving dialogue across the subdisciplinary divide between corporate, business and constitutional
scholars. Knowledge about each sub-discipline is increasingly
necessary to understand the background for, and context and

PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA
(2013); Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First
Amendment, THE NATION (June 3, 2013), available at http://tinyurl.com/mpggrf7.
2. 425 U.S. 748.
3. 435 U.S. 765.
4. 447 U.S. 557.
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implications of, recent, controversial decisions such as Citizens
5
6
United and Hobby Lobby.
The key points of the three sections are (a) from the
inception of the U.S., corporations were crucial to economic
growth and were not merely constituted but heavily regulated by
law, prominently through structural laws constraining their
activities, (b) commercial speech has been regulated throughout
U.S. legal history, both at common law and over time through
statutes and regulations that largely reflect the purposes of the
common law, and (c) the First Amendment has only recently been
used by courts to strike down laws, and even more recently to
strike down laws constraining commercial speech. In
combination, these points should (1) lead committed originalists
to reject First Amendment rights for corporate speech, (2) make
courts (whatever their interpretive approach) reluctant to find
such rights unless tightly linked to rights of specific individuals
that cannot otherwise be protected and whose expressive (not
financial) interests are represented by a legal entity, and (3)
reduce the policy appeal of such rights, because they were not
necessary to create the massive economic growth that turned a
marginal set of colonies into the world’s leading economic power
by 1900.
A. A CAPSULE HISTORY OF THE ROLE OF CORPORATIONS IN
BUSINESS HISTORY
I begin by reviewing the role of corporations in U.S. business
history. This review is broad in scope and summary in form, meant
to put in context more focused (but useful) historical accounts by
others, such as (for example) research on the question of how the
“Founding Fathers” might have thought about whether business
corporations should have First Amendment rights distinct from
those held by the individuals acting through or on behalf of the

5. 558 U.S. 466 (2010). For an empirical analysis of the consequences of Citizens
United, see John C. Coates, Corporate Politics, Governance and Value Before and After
Citizens United, 9 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 657 (2012). For a trenchant legal critique coauthored by the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, see Leo E. Strine, Jr. &
Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course? The Tension Between Conservative
Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 101 (2015). For
additional commentary, see ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and
Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 497 (“[A]ny Justice attempting
seriously to employ an originalist analysis in Citizens United would also have had to uphold
the legislation.”).
6. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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corporations, or how the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment
might have thought about the problem given the historical events
7
of the second half of the nineteenth century. The main take-away
is that businesses have long and pervasively been creatures of law
and regulation, both in the United Kingdom leading up to the
founding era, and in the U.S. corporations—in their creation,
governance and activities—have from the outset of modern
history been structured and regulated by law. This enmeshment
of businesses in law was so intrusive and intense that—had it
carried over to individuals—it would have been viewed as
intolerable. Yet it was not merely tolerated, but taken for granted,
even celebrated, for more than two centuries of Anglo-American
history.
As recounted in detail by Mary Bilder, among others,
corporations from their inception in English (and hence,
American) history were extensions of government—a “particular
type of delegated jurisdiction within the ‘King’s exclusive
8
prerogative.’” Typically, the sovereign granted what would then
have been understood as royal franchises, powers or property to
a subset of citizens, and the “corporation” of those citizens held
authority from the sovereign over the domain specified in the
corporate charter or equivalent documents. In English law, the
term “corporate” used in a modern sense to refer to a legal entity
9
can be traced to 1410, and commentary on corporations’ legal
powers dates to the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth
10
centuries, a time when incorporations were increasing.
7. See, e.g., Leo F. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The
Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); see also John C. Coates IV, State Takeover Statutes and
Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806 (1989); Ruth H.
Bloch & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Corporations and the Fourteenth Amendment (2014),
http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Faculty/Lamoreaux/corporations14th.pdf.
8. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502,
502–10 (2006) (quoting Janet McLean, The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons
for Today?, 79 IND. L.J. 363, 364 (2004)).
9. Id. at 516 n.58 (citing Y.B. 11 Hen. IV, fol. 47a, Hil., pl. 21 (1410) (Seipp No.
1410.021) (“un University fuit corporate”)), reprinted in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM,
SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at 613 (1986).
10. Id. (citing ROBERT BROOKE, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT 188–92 (1573); id.
at 517 n.61 (citing A Discourse of Corporations (c. 1587-1589), in 3 TUDOR ECONOMIC
DOCUMENTS 273 (R.H. Tawney & Eileen Power eds., 1924); id. at 513, n.39 (citing 1
EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 250
(Garland 1979) (1628); WILLIAM SHEPHEARD, OF CORPORATIONS, FRATERNITIES, AND
GUILDS 1–2 (London, H. Twyford, T. Dring & J. Plate 1659). On the numbers and nature
of corporations through English history, see RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH
LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844 (2000).
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Among these early corporations 11 were the overseas trading
12
companies, such as the East India Company. These trading
companies functioned as recognizably (early) modern for-profit
business enterprises—with dispersed private ownership, internal
and external struggles for corporate and market control, and even
13
hostile takeovers and mergers. However, they also functioned
as extensions of the military and political power of the English
government, comprising part of the emerging English naval
power and extending English control to India, the East Indies and
North America. England’s trading companies “did not pursue
‘peaceful trading’ because they believed that neither Portuguese
[the rivals of the English] nor Asian rulers would allow them to
do so without arms,” such that the “use of force remained an
integral part of the commercial presence in Asia” of business
14
corporations throughout the early modern period.
The East India Company also played an important role in
public finance, lending money to the Stuarts (with James II
becoming a shareholder), before managing to survive the
Glorious Revolution to compete with the newly formed Bank of
England and the ill-fated South Sea Company in providing fiscal
support to the new Orange monarchy, recruited from the
Netherlands to provide England’s new line of (if you will) chief
15
executive officers. Nascent political parties formed on the
shareholder bases of rival trading firms, and law, politics and
16
business were intertwined in numerous detailed ways. Over
time, the Bank of England came to play the dominant role in
British public finance, and was structurally barred from engaging
in non-financial activities, such as trade, or, as the industrial
revolution progressed, manufacturing.
11. For an overview of types of early corporations, see, for example, 1 HENRY
ALWORTH MEREWETHER & ARCHIBALD JOHN STEPHENS, THE HISTORY OF THE
BOROUGHS AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM xxviii–xxix, xxxi
(1835).
12. The best overall treatment of these earlier companies remains WILLIAM ROBERT
SCOTT, THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOINT-STOCK SYSTEM TO 1720
(Thoemmes 1993) (1910).
13. JOHN KEAY, THE HONOURABLE COMPANY: A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH EAST
INDIA COMPANY (1991); K.N. CHAUDHURI, TRADE AND CIVILIZATION IN THE INDIAN
OCEAN: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY FROM THE RISE OF ISLAM TO 1750 (1985); Dan Bogart,
There Can Be No Partnership with the King: Regulatory Commitment and the Tortured Rise
of England’s East Indian Merchant Empire (Nat’l Bur. Econ. Research, Working Paper,
2015), available at http://eml.berkeley.edu/~webfac/seminars/bogart_211seminar.pdf.
14. Chaudhuri, supra note 13.
15. Keay, supra note 13.
16. BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, CITY OF CAPITAL: POLITICS AND MARKETS IN THE
ENGLISH FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1996).
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Throughout this period, charters were granted for temporary
durations, insuring the ability of the sovereign to renegotiate their
terms and impose new conditions (and extract money) as the
terms approached. The Bubble Act of 1720 statutorily
monopolized the creation of liquid business companies, by
forbidding the sale of stock without a charter. Joint stock
companies played a significant role in manufacturing as early as
the mid-eighteenth century, as public stock markets began to
build on the basis of what were effectively sovereign bond
markets used by the English to facilitate the finance of their wars
with France, undergirded by what John Brewer famously called
its “sinews of power”—the successful British switch from
privately managed tax farming (essentially a form of highly
inefficient privatized tax collection) to much more effective and
efficient publicly administered consumption taxes (equivalent to
17
modern state and local sales taxes). That the American
Revolution was fueled by resentment over taxes levied on and
18
that the Declaration of
through “corporate” colonies,
Independence includes as one of King George’s acts of tyranny
the fact of mercantilist trade regulation, much of it designed to
19
protect the English trading companies, and that the Boston Tea
Party was aimed at and prompted by laws designed to improve the
20
financing of the East India Company, all reinforce the point that
law was viewed as a crucial tool for constraining corporations in
the period leading up to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution.
Upon the formation of the U.S., one of the first major
political battles was over another mixed public/private business
21
corporation—the First Bank of the United States. Designed by
Alexander Hamilton to enhance the power of the U.S. Treasury,
the occasion of the first (wildly oversubscribed) initial public
offering in U.S. history, the First Bank became the focus of attacks
by Democrats as beyond the power of the Federal government to
17. JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH
STATE, 1688-1783 (1988).
18. On the use of the corporate form to constitute the American colonies, and their
connections to the key players in trading companies, see, for example, Mary Sarah Bilder,
English Settlement and Local Governance, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
AMERICA (Christopher L. Tomlins & Michael Grossberg eds., 2007); ROBERT ASHTON,
THE CITY AND THE COURT, 1603-1643 (1979); and ROBERT BRENNER, MERCHANTS AND
REVOLUTION: COMMERCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONFLICT, AND LONDON’S
OVERSEAS TRADERS, 1550-1653, at 92–112 (1993).
19. The Declaration lists “the cutting off our trade with all parts of the world.”
20. BENJAMIN W. LABAREE, THE BOSTON TEA PARTY (1964).
21. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION
TO THE CIVIL WAR (1957).
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create, before having its charter lapse in 1811. 22 The many state
banks and insurance companies that were set up in part as rivals
to the First Bank were limited by the terms of their charters from
leveraging their central roles in finance into dominant roles in
other sectors. Justice Scalia’s statement in Citizens United that
there were “hundreds” of corporations in existence at the
founding is correct but a red herring: corporations in that era were
not rare, but they were heavily intertwined with government, and
as a result, just as mistrusted as government itself was mistrusted.
The closeness of corporations and government in the eyes of
the “Founding Fathers,” and the distance between their rights and
those of the individuals acting through or on behalf of
corporations, was well captured by Justice Marshall, in the first
(1819) and still among the most famous statements of the legal
theory of the corporation in U.S. legal history:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of
law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its
creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its
23
very existence.
The fact that corporations could only act in ways and to
pursue ends authorized in their charters means that—until late in
the nineteenth century, when “general purpose” clauses became
common in corporate charters—none of the corporations in
existence at the time the First Amendment was adopted was
legally authorized to engage in speech as a business activity,
particularly political speech. Newspapers—which if organized as
corporations would have been so authorized—by virtue of their
24
very purpose, were not organized as corporations. In short,

22. Id.
23. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.). As noted in Strine and Walter, “[This] holding is consistent both with contemporary
practice and the descriptions of the corporation by [corporate treatise writers] Coke,
Blackstone, and Kyd, [and] ... was reaffirmed scores of times before the Civil War.” Supra
note 7 and text accompanying note 180 (discussing the phrase “existing only in
contemplation of law”). Strikingly, the case is nowhere cited in the majority opinion in
Citizens United, or in Justice Scalia’s concurrence. The “artificial entity” theory has been
generally contrasted with two rival theories, the “aggregate” theory, which attempts to
treat a corporation as “merely” the aggregate of the individuals who create it (typically,
for such theorists, shareholders) and the “natural entity” theory, which treats corporations
as if they were individuals for legal purposes. See Coates, supra note 7, at 809–25 (reviewing
theories of the corporation in law).
24. This was acknowledged in the majority opinion in Citizens United. “The great
debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists over our founding document
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corporations generally had no First Amendment rights because
they had no authorization to engage in the activities protected by
25
the First Amendment—that is, such activities were “ultra vires.”
The one exception—an important one that helps prove this
general point—is that many religious organizations were
chartered corporations, with explicit authority to engage in
religious activities, and they would obviously be able to engage in
religious activities protected by the Free Exercise clause of the
26
First Amendment.
The year that the First Bank’s charter lapsed (1811) was the
same year that New York became the first state to adopt a
“general” incorporation statute for business corporations, by
27
which any citizen could create a business corporation. Prior to
that date, business corporations had continued to be specially
created by one-off laws and hence close interactions between
28
corporate founders and elected politicians. Even after that date,
most new corporations continued to be specially chartered,
creating a political/business system rife with opportunities for
corruption that continued to characterize and challenge the
were published and expressed in the most important means of mass communication of that
era—newspapers owned by individuals.” 558 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).
25. In the context of corporate political expenditures—i.e., “speech” under Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1974), see Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson, 293 Fed. 208, 226 (M.D. Ala.
1923) (finding that campaign contributions are personal expenditures of officers for ratemaking purposes); McConnell v. Combination Min. & Mill. Co., 31 Mont. 563, 79 Pac. 248
(1905) (holding that expenses incurred in lobbying for passage of a bill charged to directors
as beyond corporate purposes); People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410, 439, 80 N.E.
383, 386-89 (1907) (larceny prosecution for contributing corporate funds to political party).
See also Opinion Letter to the Savings and Loan Commissioner, California Attorney
General, October 14, 1960, p. 2 (finding that a statute broadening the power of
corporations to permit charitable gifts does not extend to political causes) (cited in
Corporate Political Affairs Programs, 70 YALE L.J. 821, 854 n. 206 (1961)).
26. 2 J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS
24 (1917) at 16–17.
27. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,
at 109–39 (1977); Paddy Ireland, Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock
Company Share and the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate
Personality, 17 J. LEG. HIST. 41-73 (1996); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 124–38, 511–31 (2d ed. 1985).
28. This fact was noted by the dissent in Citizens United, but ignored by the majority.
“Those few corporations that existed at the founding were authorized by grant of a special
legislative charter.” 130 S. Ct. at 949 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia’s concurrence
tries to confuse the issue by noting (correctly) that “[a]t the time of the founding, religious,
educational, and literary corporations were incorporated under general incorporation
statutes, much as business corporations are today.” Id. at 926. However, he does not
acknowledge that at that time—that is, at the time of the writing and adoption of the First
Amendment—business corporations were not so covered by general incorporation
statutes. See 2 J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS 24 (1917) at 16–17.
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sensibilities of 19th century voters, lawyers, and courts. 29 The battle
over the Second Bank of the United States underlines the point:
backers and foes alike occupied multiple roles as politicians,
shareholders, borrowers, and backers of rival state banks. The
structure and nature of the Second Bank was both for-profit and
private, but also structured by its relations and terms of its
30
engagement with the U.S. government. Alongside the fights over
31
banks were struggles over canals and railroads, with the same
mix of public/private characteristics persisting, with each
transportation company needing special government action to
create the rights of way and local monopolies, and to facilitate
financing, even as the companies promised and in some cases
generated significant public goods in the form of economic growth
and rapidly increased public mobility.
As Justice Scalia acknowledges in Citizens United, the
32
“Founders” bore “resentment towards corporations.” He tries
to blunt the force of this concession by arguing that this
resentment existed only because they commonly held “stategranted monopoly privileges,” which (he asserts) “modern
33
corporations” do not have. But his argument falls short for
several reasons, historical and modern. First, Berle and Means
were the first to popularize the phrase “separation of ownership
and control” but did not invent the concept, nor were they the first
to identify it as a threat to social welfare. Founding-era observers
such as Adam Smith critiqued large corporations not on the
ground of monopoly power—which he famously identified as a
34
risk of all business activity, and not solely of businesses
organized as corporations—but also on the ground that dispersed
ownership creates what would modernly be called agency
problems towards which corporate and securities law have largely

29. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR. & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE
(Waveland Press 2002) (1871) (vividly recounting corrupt and violent stories of railroad
corporation activity in the middle of the nineteenth century).
30. Hammond, supra note 21.
31. Harris, supra note 10. For the best treatment of English railway corporations,
including vivid details on how corrupt and interconnected with state power they were, see
generally R.W. KOSTAL, LAW AND ENGLISH RAILWAY CAPITALISM, 1825-1875 (1994).
32. 130 S. Ct. at 926.
33. Id.
34. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 144 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (1776) (“People of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”).
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been aimed at addressing. 35 Second, the very fact that Foundingera corporations commonly held monopolies makes it impossible
to sort out which feature create their resentment—Scalia’s claim
that it was their monopoly powers that created the resentment is
not implausible, but it is inescapably speculative. Founding-era
observers must have thought that grants of monopoly power
generated social benefits, and were willing to grant special
corporate legal status only because of those benefits, in which case
the resentment would be more properly generated by special legal
status, and not monopoly powers.
From a modern perspective, the shortcomings of Scalia’s
argument begin with the fact that many modern corporations—
including public utilities involved in cases such as Central
Hudson—do in fact have privileges (special powers, barriers to
entry, government contracts) similar to privileges of Founding-era
corporations; so too with telecommunications companies, airlines,
banks, railroads, defense contractors, and the rest of governmentdependent or -protected sectors that comprise roughly a third of
36
the value of all privately owned business. In addition, all modern
corporations enjoy legal benefits not enjoyed by individuals or
unincorporated associations: limited liability, which transfers
value from all potential tort victims into a subsidy for risky
activities; asset partitioning, which greatly economizes on
transaction costs and which some scholars have argued is the most
37
important economic benefit of the corporate form; indefinite
life, which in combination with separate tax identity for public
corporations provides significant economic advantages; and the
ability to sue and be sued as a fictional legal person.
What can we take away from this capsule history of business
corporations in England and the U.S.? First, the conception of
business corporations as fully private, equivalent to individuals in
operation, is a late development—emerging well after the
adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and even the
Civil War Amendments. To the contrary corporations—even

35. Id. at 264–65 (“[D]irectors of [joint stock companies], being the managers rather
of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private
copartnery frequently watch over their own”).
36. For data on heavily regulated (and hence government-protected) and
government-dependent sectors, see Coates, supra note 5, at Table 1.
37. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (2000) (discussing significance of “asset
partitioning”).
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closely held ones—were viewed primarily as public, 38 and as such
subject to constitutionally imposed limitations, and often powers,
39
but not affirmative rights against regulation. Second, the tools of
“regulation” (not a word then in use, but a fair description) were
varied, and included explicit limits in corporate charters, as well
as explicit requirements (the Second Bank of the US, for example,
40
was required to redeem notes in its charter ), short terms for
charters (to require negotiated renewal), explicit bargains for
charter grants, implicit bargains (sometimes corrupt or hidden),
structural regulation (limiting, for example, the physical locations
of corporate activities, including for example the routes of
railroads or canals), grants of monopoly, of takings powers, and
41
so on. Third, only in the Lochner era did corporations begin to
function in a fully private fashion, and even then, even when
business interests successfully used the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses to achieve deregulatory (or, more accurately,
42
re-regulatory) goals, the First Amendment was not a significant
component of those efforts, as discussed more below. In sum, as
discussed more below, the First Amendment played no significant
role in facilitating the massive economic growth that accompanied
th
the transportation revolution of the 19 century, nor did it
significantly disrupt or slow down the backlash against the rapidly
growing railroad companies and business trusts, as reflected in
increasing federal regulation (e.g., the Interstate Commerce
38. For classic expositions of the heavily integrated public and private sectors in the
early part of American history, see, for example, HARRY N. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA
(1968); OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774–1861 (2d
ed. 1969); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956). See also Karen Orren, The Laws of
Industrial Organizations, 1870–1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
AMERICA 531 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
39. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity
– Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L.
REV. 933, 945 (1952) (“Had the question come up, let us say, in 1800, when there were only
300 recorded corporations in the United States...the lawyer arguing that they were purely
private and, because private, not within the scope of constitutional limitations on
governmental action would have had the difficult side of the argument.”).
40. Hammond, supra note 21.
41. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (explaining that corporations
have liberty of contract, and due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment prevents state
from barring corporate “citizen” from mailing a notice describing goods it seeks to insure
under a policy issued by a foreign insurance company); Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust
Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (holding that railroad corporations could not be required to
charge less than tariff proposed by state railroad commission under due process clause if
it would leave railroad unable to pay its debts); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
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Commission, established 1887 43) and the sometimes heavy hand
of antitrust enforcement (e.g., the Standard Oil breakup in
44
1910 ).
B. A BRIEF TOUR OF LAWS REGULATING CORPORATE
SPEECH IN LEGAL HISTORY
Perhaps the above recounting of the history of the
intertwining of corporations and law may seem off-point in an
article on the First Amendment. Perhaps the “regulation”
reflected in business history just reviewed can be separated from
laws “abridging” the freedom of speech, including commercial
speech generally, or corporate speech specifically. But a brief
review of traditional laws relevant to the conduct of business—
both court-created and statutory—undermines this idea, too. The
key point of this section is that commercial and corporate
speech—in the most important activities of every business,
including contract formation, retention and regulation of agents,
and engaging in risk-taking activities—was pervasively regulated
and structured by law long before the modern, expansive version
of the First Amendment, which the next section will show was
invented only recently.
To quickly sketch how pervasively law regulated commercial
speech throughout U.S. history, let us put aside the problems of
any literal, textualist reading of the First Amendment, which
would appear to curtail only Congress, and not the President or
executive agencies. Let us also skip the usual problems for
sweeping understandings of the First Amendment—e.g., laws
against libel, threats, conspiracy, and obscenity that were long
enforced before and after the First Amendment, with little sense
of contradiction by anyone involved. Instead, let us focus on the
pervasive sets of laws that constrained and burdened business
speech. Specifically, consider how law “abridged” speech by those
in business in their routine activities of forming contracts, hiring
agents, and engaging in risk-taking.
Regulation of Speech in Contract Formation. To form
contracts, businesses must speak—indeed, as Robert Post has
noted, “The process of contract formation . . . consists entirely of

43. For a historical comment on the Act by one of the founders of the oldest
continuously operating US corporate law firm, Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP, see
George W. Wickersham, Federal Control of Interstate Commerce, 23 HARV. L. REV. 241
(1910).
44. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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communication.” 45 His laconic, passing observation is worth
elaborating, to emphasize the economic significance of the speech
so regulated. The combination of an intricate and sometimes
counterintuitive body of law, on the one hand, with the way
businesses and their representatives speak, on the other hand,
determines whether a contract is formed, and if so, what its
content is. At this intersection, the law routinely imposes
economic penalties on businesses for speech or silence.
Courts penalize certain types of speech by refusing to enforce
46
contracts that are insufficiently definite, or which fail to
47
specifically accept offers as made, or which include deceptive
48
misrepresentations, or by finding enforceable contracts based on
49
past conduct or course of dealing, or on words that are
ambiguous as to their intent, all despite attempts to deny their
50
existence, based on precisely how parties did or did not speak.
Contract law also “implies” what it calls “representations” or
“warranties” from context, unless contracting parties make
51
specific statements to deny liability —effectively compelling
speech. Quasi-contract doctrines like promissory estoppel are
52
founded on speech acts.
A form of contract historically important to economic growth
was the promissory or negotiable bill or note—a form of writing
that was intended to allow value to pass among strangers to

45. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech 9 (Yale Law School
Faculty Scholarship Series, Working Paper No. 190, 2000).
46. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003) (finding that “the indefiniteness doctrine lives on in the
common law of contracts”).
47. See, e.g., Glenway Industries, Inc. v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 686 F.2d 415 (6th
Cir. 1982) (noting that under Pennsylvania law, offeror is “master of the offer” and unless
offeree accepts in accordance with terms of offer, offeree cannot sue on contract or in
reliance).
48. See, e.g., Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155 (N.Y. 1957) (finding that the contract
could be rescinded based on promises to finance business not intended to be kept when
made).
49. See Restatement of Contracts § 69 (silence may constitute acceptance based on
intent and facts).
50. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59, and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 60, with U.C.C. § 2-207, each of which treats ambiguous
communications responding to a contract offer differently in determining contract
formation.
51. See, e.g., In re Mercer, 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[E]ach use of pre-approved
credit card by Chapter 7 debtor was in nature of implied representation by debtor of her
intent to repay any credit extended[.]”).
52. See Eric M. Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 263 (1996).
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facilitate trade and finance. 53 Attempts to restrict the assignability
of notes—a particular form of written speech—could turn on
54
minor differences in language. More modernly, notes have to
55
take a particular form to be negotiable, and significant
differences in legal outcomes could (and still can) turn on minor
differences in language. In particular, defenses to enforcement
could depend on small variations in word choice and form of
writing. Similarly important categories of business transaction are
those involving real estate and security interests, each of which
require special speech-acts—including the recording of transfers
or security interests—to accomplish the goals of those market
transactions. Indeed, Homer Kripke long ago suggested that in
the context of security interests the word “perfection” be replaced
with “giving (or excusing) public notice”—i.e., the making of a
56
particular form of legally required speech act.
Regulation of Speech in Hiring Agents. Beyond contract law,
courts use the common law of agency effectively to force those
owning or running businesses to speak to third parties about who
has authority to bind the business (whether organized as
57
corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship), and to impose
contract liabilities for loose speech that implies that someone is
agent, even if the corporation’s internal communications make it
clear that they are not. Agency law also regulates speech by
decreeing that words equivalent to direction of the physical
conduct of their activities render an agent an “employee” (or, in
older usage, a “servant”) capable of producing tort liability on the
58
speaking principal. Agents, in turn, are subject to duties of

53. J. M. HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW
(1955); JAMES S. ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES: A
STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAW (1995).
54. See e.g., Z. SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE . . . AND A TREATISE ON
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES 298 (1810) (“All bills payable to a certain
person, or order, or to the order of a certain person; or to a certain person, or bearer; or to
the bearer generally: or where equivalent words are used: are transferable by indorsement,
or delivering from hand to hand, ad infinitum: so as to vest the assignee with a right of
action, on the instrument against the parties to it, in his own name. This is what constitutes
the negotiable quality of the instrument[.]”) (cited in James S. Rogers, The Myth of
Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. REV. 265 n.20 (1990)).
55. For the modern legal test, see U.C.C. § 3-104 (defining “negotiable instrument”
by excluding writings that include undertakings beyond the promise to pay money, with
certain exceptions).
56. See Peter F. Coogan, Article 9—An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J.
1012, 1032 n.75 (1978).
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (defining apparent authority).
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (defining respondeat superior); §
7.07 (defining “employee”).
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loyalty, which includes subsidiary duties not to speak about
confidences learned from or about their principals, even when the
speech touches on the public interest, First Amendment
59
notwithstanding.
Regulation of Speech in Risk-Taking. When businesses
engage in risky activities, that may impose harms on third parties,
the way they speak (to warn, for example) can influence their
60
liability. Tort and fraudulent conveyance law punishes not only
fraud by forbidding misleading speech, but also forms of silence,
61
effectively compelling speech in specified settings. Corporate
law requires those seeking to use the corporate form to “speak”
by creating and filing public charters, disclosing their purposes
62
and governance. Antitrust law forbids agreements in restraint of
trade, including companies from agreeing (a form of speech) to
fix prices, which may be inferred from sharing information (i.e.,
63
speaking to each other) about prices. More general doctrines—
waiver, estoppel—impose liability as a result of speech in a wide
variety of settings without running afoul of the First
64
Amendment.
Regulation of Speech in the Modern Regulatory State. All of
these doctrines pre-date the modern regulatory state, and have
evolved significantly since then, and continue to do so, sometimes
shaped by statutory interventions. Beginning in the early
twentieth century, accelerating in the New Deal, and then surging
again in the 1960s, the modern regulatory state brought into
widespread acceptance a wide array of additional laws that curtail
or burden speech: securities laws, consumer protection laws,
truth-in-lending laws, common carrier laws, professional licensing

59. Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
60. See, e.g., Oberson v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service et al., 514 F.3d 989
(2010) (finding that failure to post a warning sign on a dangerous trail created tort liability
for negligence on the part of Forest Service).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (liability for nondisclosure under
various circumstances).
62. See, e.g., Delaware General Corporation Law § 102 (setting required provisions
in publicly filed corporate charter, including “purposes” and any deviations from default
corporate statutory provisions for governance).
63. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Electric Corp. et al. v. General Electric Company, et al.,
244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (communication of price sheets and related topics among
competitors provided evidence of price-fixing conspiracy violating Sherman Act).
64. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 570 U.S. 663 (1991) (“Minnesota doctrine
of promissory estoppel is a law of general applicability ... [and] enforcement of such general
laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to
enforcement against other persons or organizations...”).
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laws, etc. 65 This is not to mention the specific laws barring the
“active promotion of prescription drugs, liquor, cigarettes, and
other products” noted by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in
66
Virginia Pharmacy. And, of course, as noted by the majority in
Citizens United:
At least since the latter part of the 19th century, the laws of
some States and of the United States imposed a ban on
67
corporate direct contributions to candidates.

These statutes, regulations, and related court interpretations
are varied in content and effect, but worth emphasizing is that
many in practice track elements of the common law doctrines
68
69
reviewed above, or alter them while preserving other elements.
As a result, it is hard to see any reason not to extend to much of
these modern statutes and regulations any general presumption
that common law doctrines of ancient vintage or general
applicability are exempted from strict or intermediate scrutiny, or
otherwise treated lightly, under from the First Amendment. Many
of these laws have also been challenged under the First
Amendment in recent years, as discussed below.
But before turning to a review of the First Amendment
challenges, a simple point should here be recognized: these laws
all predate any understanding of First Amendment doctrine that
includes a distinct commercial speech component, first announced
in Virginia Pharmacy, and none were seriously viewed as contrary
to the First Amendment at the time they were adopted.

65. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.; Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301 et seq.; Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1451–61; Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (implemented in, for example,
6 Del. Ch. 25; Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601; Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104; N.Y. DR 3-101 (unauthorized practice of law)).
66. 425 U.S. at 781.
67. 130 S. Ct. at 900 (citing B. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM 23 (2001)).
68. Many consumer protection laws, for example, contain anti-fraud provisions that
are substantially similar to the common law of fraud. See, e.g., 6 DEL. CODE ANN.
§ 2532(a)(4) (“A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when ... that person ... uses
deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods
or services”). For an overview of consumer protection laws, see MARY DEE PRIDGEN,
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW (2013).
69. The federal securities laws, for example, largely track the common law of fraud,
but eliminate, modify, or reverse certain common law elements, such as scienter, privity,
or damages. See JOEL SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3d ed. 2003).
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C. THE NON-ROLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ECONOMIC
HISTORY
The last section described how pervasively corporate and
commercial speech was regulated throughout legal history. In this
section, I briefly review First Amendment history to show that
this pervasive regulation long pre-dated modern First
Amendment doctrines, to show how radical modern First
Amendment doctrine is, as applied to corporate and commercial
speech, and to show that the doctrine is a poor fit with the
inevitable need for political compromise in the American method
of lawmaking. The chronology—pervasive speech regulation of
commerce before development of First Amendment doctrine—
and the fact that modern business use of the First Amendment
represents a radical break with the history and traditions of U.S.
law should quite important to anyone who purports to be a strong
originalist in interpreting the Constitution. It should also be of
relevance to anyone with even a partially originalist
understanding of the U.S. Constitution. Finally, it has also an
important implication for policy judgments about how important
or valuable modern First Amendment doctrine is in advancing
economic growth and social welfare. The incompatibility of the
doctrine with American political realities only reinforces the
problematic nature of the corporate takeover of the First
Amendment.
The facts of the chronology that follows will be familiar to
constitutional scholars but perhaps less so to corporate scholars.
Most basically, it may be surprising to non-specialists that the
First Amendment as we know it today is a recent judicial
invention. For the first half of U.S. history, it played only a modest
role in law, as reflected in legal decisions and the opinions of
famous jurists. As late as 1907, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
stated that the First Amendment did not apply to the states and,
even as applied to Congress, its “main purpose” was to “to
prevent . . . previous restraints upon publications as had been
practiced by other governments,” “not [to] prevent the
subsequent punishment of such [publications] as may be deemed
70
contrary to the public welfare.” Already by that point, well
before the Supreme Court used the First Amendment to strike
70. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. the Attorney General of the State of Colorado, 205
U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.); cf. Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First
Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156, 1202 (1986) (“The Supreme Court . . . did not decide
a case involving prior restraint until 1931 . . . and did not consider a case involving judicial
prior restraint . . . until 1968.”).
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down a law, the U.S. economy had become the richest in the
71
world, as depicted in Figure 1.

Country Share of World GDP
Over Time
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Figure 1. Source: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm

The Supreme Court did not rely on the First Amendment to
strike down a law of any kind until 1931—that is, 140 years after
the First Amendment was adopted—and no federal law until
72
1965. Even accounting for prior cases refusing to enforce laws as
71. See MADDISON-PROJECT, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/
home.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (discussing per capita GDP by country over time)
and http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (discussing
aggregate GDP by country over time).
72. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (first case voiding a state law under
the First Amendment); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (first case
voiding a federal law under the First Amendment). One earlier case, Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U.S. 380 (1927), struck down a state law under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as representing an “arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power,
unwarrantably infringing the liberty of the defendant,” in context where the conduct in
question consisted of speech and references were made in the state court opinion to the
challenges based on the “constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech,” which that court
had rejected. Still earlier cases in and following World War I, famously including opinions
enunciating the “clear and present danger test,” in which Justices Holmes and Brandeis
began to articulate a broader conception of First Amendment protections, nevertheless
upheld lower court convictions based on speech. See Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of

COATES_FINAL DRAFT III (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

CORPORATE SPEECH

7/8/2015 10:50 AM

241

applied, the First Amendment was not a significant part of the
legal arsenal for the protection of business or economic activity
prior to the second half of the twentieth century. The landmark
cases that have given the First Amendment its prominence since
the middle of the twentieth century were primarily concerned
73
with individuals acting outside of that context: dissidents, public
74
75
76
employees, students, and civil rights activists.
As shown in the empirical analysis in Part II, cases in which
businesses were the direct beneficiaries of judicial review of laws
for violations of the right to free speech are even more recent. The
77
78
first such case (Joseph Burstyn, Inc. ) did not occur until 1952,
and the doctrine of “commercial speech,” in which businesses
speak not for expressive purposes but for primarily business
purposes, was not accepted in the Supreme Court until Virginia
79
Pharmacy, in 1976. Nor was the First Amendment extended to
corporate political activity until 1978, in Bellotti, nor was it
articulated in its modern form—complete with the requirement
that a law be well-tailored to fit its purpose to survive First
80
Amendment scrutiny—until Central Hudson, in 1980.
Each of these three cases is worth discussing briefly for three
reasons. First, each is an important part of the foundation for
contemporary controversial cases such as Citizens United and
Hobby Lobby. Second, each was controversial at the time,
generated strong dissents by the generally pro-business Justice
Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1171 (1982).
73. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(children whose parents object to flag salute could not be compelled to do so); Yates et al.
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (overturning convictions of officials of the
Communist Party USA, Court narrowly interpreted federal statute making it unlawful to
advocate overthrow of government, articulating “clear and present danger” test).
74. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
(holding that teacher may not be dismissed for letter to newspaper critical of school
budget).
75. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(holding that students “do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate”).
76. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (finding that state
government officials violated the First Amendment by ordering an end to an orderly and
otherwise lawful civil rights march in front of the state house).
77. 343 U.S. 495.
78. Burstyn is the oldest case cited in the string cite in Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at
900, laying out the “historical” case for its premise that corporations have First
Amendment rights. An older case, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936),
resulted in a finding that a tax aimed specifically at newspaper businesses violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause by abridging the freedom of the press.
79. 425 U.S. 748.
80. 447 U.S. 557.
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Rehnquist, and as will be suggested in the discussion, each
remains vulnerable to legal critique. Third, each is a reflection of
what has been fairly characterized as a “movement” among
81
businesses and conservatives that began in the early 1970s, which
itself is an important part of context for understanding these cases
and their potential effects. This movement was stimulated in part
by the 1971 “Powell memo,” in which Lewis Powell—before he
went on the Supreme Court—advocated that the Chamber of
Commerce undertake a broad, multi-channel effort at mobilizing
corporations and their resources to defend capitalism and the
82
“free enterprise system.”
This movement was needed, Powell asserted, to defend
against a growing and dangerous movement of academics, media,
intellectuals, clergy, and politicians to attack business and
capitalism, by pushing such ideas as consumerism and
environmental protection. “Under our constitutional system,” he
wrote, “especially with an activist-minded Supreme Court, the
judiciary may be the most important instrument for social,
economic and political change.” In other words, Powell’s memo
advocated using the courts not simply to enforce or interpret the
law—the standard publicly stated understanding of political
83
conservatives such as Chief Justice Roberts —but to change the
law.
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court held that the First
Amendment overrides laws abridging commercial speech,
arguing that the distinction between commercial and other speech
was “simplistic” and difficult to draw. Since no pharmacy sought
81. ROBERT L. KERR, THE CORPORATE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT (2008). As Kerr
notes at 7, the Business Roundtable was formed in 1972, which helped push previously
politically moderate trade groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and the National
Association of Manufacturers to the right. Kerr’s account is similar to that told by The
Economist editors John Micklethwait and Adrian Woolridge. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT
& ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE FOURTH REVOLUTION: THE GLOBAL RACE TO
REINVENT THE STATE (2014).
82. See Memorandum from Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr. to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Education
Committee Chairman, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), available at
law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf
[hereinafter Powell Memorandum]. The Powell Memorandum was less than two months
old before Powell was nominated to serve as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, but not publicly released until after he had been confirmed on the Court.
See Mark Schmitt, The Legend of the Powell Memo, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Apr. 27,
2005), available at http://prospect.org/article/legend-powell-memo.
83. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 31
(2005) (statement of John Roberts) (testifying that judges should be “umpires” who “don’t
make the rules; they apply them”).
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to “speak” (i.e., advertise the drug prices as had been banned in
the law under review), the Court focused instead on the interest
of the audience – the consumer – to “hear” the forbidden speech
(i.e., drug price advertising), an interest the Court thought
“keener . . . than . . . the day’s most urgent political debate.” In so
holding, the Court explicitly overruled several of its precedents,
which had established the proposition that commercial speech
was in fact entitled to less, or no, First Amendment protection,
84
85
including cases from 1942 and 1951, and repudiated dicta from
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), which had stressed that
86
the speech in that case was “not ‘purely commercial.’” Citing
several of its precedents in which bans on speech by individuals or
87
expressive businesses (film companies, newspapers, etc. ) were
found unconstitutional, the Court extended First Amendment
protection to any (non-deceptive) expression by any business—a
dramatic if subtle expansion of the reach of the Courts in
overseeing economic regulation. Nowhere did the Court note or
discuss the significance of the broad and traditional range of laws
and regulations that had long regulated commercial speech
without comment or First Amendment challenge, such as those
reviewed above.
Two years after Virginia Pharmacy, in First National Bank of
88
Boston v. Bellotti, the Court extended it into a domain just
opened up by the equation of money with speech in Buckley v.
89
Valeo in 1976. Revealing political ambitions that Justice Powell
had long secretly harbored but were unknown to the public when
90
he was appointed to the Court, Powell’s opinion in Bellotti
affirmed in the strongest terms a corporate “right” to free
expression, founded in the simple logic that corporations were
(legally) people, and people have rights under the First

84. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (upholding a statute banning handbills on
streets).
85. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (upholding an ordinance banning door-todoor magazine subscriptions).
86. 376 U.S. 254.
87. See, e.g., id.; Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959).
88. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
89. 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group
can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached.”).
90. See Schmitt, supra note 82.
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Amendment, and through the Due Process Clause of the
91
Fourteenth Amendment rights against the states.
This syllogism held (said the Court) even though the law in
question permitted corporations to speak about political issues
affecting corporate property, and only banned the use of
corporate funds to speak on other political issues, and so could
have been readily understood as a restraint on how corporate
managers spend corporate (i.e., shareholder) money for noncorporate purposes, rather than as a ban on corporate speech
generally. This syllogism held even though the Court had
previously upheld complete bans on union and corporate
92
donations to political candidates. This syllogism held despite
Powell’s earlier dissent in Pipefitters, in which he expressed
dismay at the majority opinion in that case, because it “open[ed]
the way for major participation in politics by the largest
aggregations of economic power, the great unions and
93
corporations.” To be sure, in Bellotti, the Court held back from
a full-bore equation of corporations with individuals, noting that
since this case concerned “a corporation’s right to speak on issues
of general public interest,” the holding implied “no comparable
right in the quite different context of participation in a political
campaign for election to public office,” and “Congress might well
be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or
apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations
94
to influence candidate elections.”
In Central Hudson, the Court went farther. Claiming to base
95
96
its formulation on prior cases (Virginia Pharmacy, Bates,
97
98
99
Primus, Bellotti, and Carey ), the Court articulated the still91. 435 U.S. at 780–81 and nn.14–15.
92. See e.g., United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 568 (1957) (enforcing Federal
Corrupt Practices Act of 1935 over dissent that emphasized that the law “as construed and
applied, is a broadside assault on the freedom of political expression guaranteed by the
First Amendment”).
93. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 443 (1972).
94. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n. 26.
95. Virginia Pharm. Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(holding unconstitutional a law forbidding pharmacies from advertising drug prices).
96. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a
law banning advertising of legal services).
97. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding that a law barring solicitation of
prospective litigation clients was unconstitutional).
98. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding
unconstitutional a law forbidding a corporation from spending money on ballot initiatives
not affecting property, business or assets of corporation).
99. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (finding unconstitutional a
law banning advertising of contraceptives ).
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dominant multi-step test for commercial speech cases. First, in a
step often not articulated formally, the Court determines if the
case involves “commercial speech” – if not, it applies some other
doctrinal analysis. Second, if it does involve commercial speech,
the Court asks if the speech concerns lawful activity and is not
100
misleading – if not, then the speech is not protected at all. If so,
then the laws must pass three tests to be constitutional: (a) they
must serve “substantial” government interests, (b) they must do
so “directly” and (c) they may restrict no more speech than
“necessary,” referred to as the “fit” requirement.
The Court’s purported precedents in Central Hudson in fact
provided only weak support for the test it articulated. Primus
involved a non-profit public interest law firm, not a business, and
the speech was held by the Court to be a “form of political
expression,” entitled to the highest form of First Amendment
protection, not the nominally lower protection afforded
commercial speech even after Central Hudson. Bellotti likewise
involved political activity, albeit in the form of corporate
expenditures. Carey, cited in Central Hudson to support its fit
requirement, expressly noted that the law was not aimed at
commercial speech, but “at the ideas conveyed and form of
101
expression.” While Bates did suggest that laws short of a flat ban
might have survived scrutiny, consistent with the fit requirement
in Central Hudson, it nowhere suggested that to survive a law
could only go so far as “necessary” to achieve a substantial public
interest, but instead simply acknowledged that “many of the
problems in defining the boundary between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising remain to be resolved,” and even suggested
that laws might constitutionally restrict advertisements of the
“quality of services” where the quality could not be measured or

100. In this respect, the test is weaker than in political or other individual, noncommercial speech contexts, where falsity is generally not a reason to eliminate First
Amendment protection altogether. Compare N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(because “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, “ even false statements of fact
must be protected to some extent, “if the freedom of expression [is] to have ‘breathing
space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive’”), with United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)
(holding unconstitutional a law criminalizing false statements about having a military
medal), with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 468 (1942) (“prevention and
punishment” of “libelous” speech is “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it]
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”), and Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (finding that criminal prosecution of defamation is
constitutional).
101. 431 U.S. at 702 n.28.
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verified. 102 Central Hudson was a bold and aggressive example of
judicial activism, and paved the way for a corporate takeover of
the First Amendment—right in line with Powell’s 1971 memo
calling for a new corporate political movement to work its will
103
through the courts. In practice, as documented in Part II,
Central Hudson has provided an open invitation to courts to strike
down laws “abridging” speech by businesses, even if the laws
serve concededly “substantial” and legitimate purposes, even if
the interests are served in a straightforward and intuitive fashion,
and even if the speech in question has no political or ideological
content.
104
A recent case—POM Wonderful, LLC —illustrates the way
the “fit” requirement has transformed the nominally
“intermediate” form of judicial review under Central Hudson into
a blank check for activist judges to de- or re-regulate on behalf of
businesses. In POM Wonderful, LLC, a panel of the D.C. Circuit
considered a Federal Trade Commission order requiring that
“health claims” used in marketing food products be substantiated
by “competent and reliable scientific evidence that is sufficient in
quality and quantity,” and that unless the evidence included at
least two randomly controlled trial (RCT) studies, the marketing
had to include qualifying language indicating the research was
“preliminary” or “initial.” While conceding the intuitively
obvious justification for the order as serving “substantial”
governmental interests in protecting consumers from misleading
claims, and that the order directly served those interests, the
Court found that the order did not “fit” the purpose served,
because—in the Court’s opinion, nowhere supported by metastudies about the reliability of RCTs or the relevance of statistical
significance in a single RCT—one RCT might be just as good as
two at substantiating the claims. Even a casual review of the
literature on science would have provided ample ground for a
neutral observer to want to see more than one study before letting
a corporate marketing machine take a run at an unsuspecting
105
public with unqualified claims based on “science.” While the
102. 433 U.S. 383–84.
103. See generally Powell Memorandum, supra note 82.
104. POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, 2015 WL 394093 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2015).
105. See, e.g., RETRACTION WATCH, http://retractionwatch.com (website devoted to
retractions of peer-reviewed published articles in a range of sciences) (last visited March
21, 2015); Daniele Fanelli, How Many Scientists Fabricate and Falsify Research? A
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Survey Data, PLOS ONE 1 (May 29, 2009) (“In
surveys asking about the behavior of colleagues, admission rates were 14.12% for
falsification,” “misconduct was reported more frequently by medical/pharmacological
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Court attempted to argue that if the FTC had found, in the specific
case, reason to doubt the one study, it could have justified
requiring a second study, the Court nowhere explained why a
prophylactic rule requiring two studies was not a reasonable fit to
an order limiting unqualified marketing claims.
The bottom line lesson of POM Wonderful LLC is clear:
regulatory agencies under Central Hudson face a strong risk that
a court will be able to exploit any mismatch between the court’s
(often uneducated or even ignorant) view of what is “necessary”
to accomplish the agency’s goals to strike down a regulation.
Lurking in the background of the “fit” requirement, as also
illustrated by POM Wonderful LLC, is a politically naïve (or
disingenuous) notion often trotted out in cases under Central
Hudson that agencies or legislatures can simply rewrite their
regulations or statutes with minimal effort and delay, to bring
them into line with the court’s view of what is “necessary” to
achieve the valid purposes of the regulation or statute. Such
naivete is hard to understand in an era of political logjams, “donothing” Congresses, and increasingly bitter and polarized
politics, which make it more likely that the result of a court
striking down a law is that it will stay struck. It also flies in the face
of long-standing theory underwriting at least some jurists’
resistance to the use of legislative history—i.e., that a multimember regulatory or legislative body is not an “it” but a “they,”
and unlike the text of the rule or the statute, legislative history
reflects only a subset of the members’ views, rather than the
compromise reflected in the final text. This perspective should be
remembered when evaluating the “fit” requirement of Central
Hudson in practice, because it is a reminder that imperfectly
fitting rules and statutes are part of the price of political
compromise, which is the essence of the American method of
lawmaking.
Putting this short history of the First Amendment and its
application to commercial speech together with the business and
legal history above, the bottom line is that the First Amendment
had no operative legal role in creating or sustaining the great era
th
of US economic growth that began in the 19 century and
continued through the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, during most of
American history, at most, the First Amendment served
researchers than others . . . [and] it appears likely that this is a conservative estimate of the
true prevalence of scientific misconduct”), available at http://journals.plos.org/plosone/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0005738.
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principally as a symbol and hortatory summation of the value of
free expression by individuals, and even after the Supreme Court
began striking down laws in the 1930s and 1940s, it did not
commonly do so for business (as will be shown more
106
systematically in Part II). These roles for the First Amendment
might have played a role in the political restraint of regulation of
expression generally, and perhaps even by businesses in limited
contexts (such as expressive businesses, such as newspapers), but
the First Amendment played little to no role in restraining the
regulation of commercial speech as such, until the recent era
inaugurated in Virginia Pharmacy. Too many statutes and
regulations, and too many courts using too many common law
doctrines, routinely and pervasively regulated speech by
businesses prior to the 1970s, with little general public complaint
or widespread efforts to resist on the ground that those laws
violated the First Amendment, for any fair understanding of U. S.
economic history to assert otherwise. While the ramp-up in
business regulation in the late 1960s and early 1970s might have
justified political concerns by business groups, as illustrated by the
Powell memo, nothing in U.S. business history or its legal or
constitutional traditions did so. The corporate takeover of the
First Amendment is a modern doctrinal invention.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE CORPORATE
TAKEOVER OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Let us test the historical summary set out in Part I.C against
some case data. This Part analyzes data from Supreme Court and
Circuit Court decisions to illustrate how recently the corporate
takeover of the First Amendment has occurred, and how
pervasively and systematically corporations have been using the
First Amendment to achieve de- or re-regulatory goals. To my
knowledge, this quantitative exercise has not been previously
undertaken. The findings are that (a) prior to Virginia Pharmacy
only expressive businesses challenging laws that directly impeded
their core business were able to convince the Court to strike down
laws on their behalf, and not other businesses seeking to achieve
de- or re-regulatory goals generally; (b) First Amendment cases
in which businesses are the primary beneficiary have increasingly
displaced cases in which individuals are the primary beneficiary,
106. Geoffrey R. Stone’s fascinating book, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WAR
TIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004), for example,
does not mention commercial speech, businesses, corporations, or any related topic.
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with the docket now roughly split between business and individual
cases; (c) the Central Hudson doctrine has encouraged an
increasing number of commercial speech cases to be brought over
time; and (d) cases currently in the Courts of Appeal under
Central Hudson predominantly do not involve expressive
businesses, but are attacks on laws and regulations that inhibit
“speech” by other kinds of businesses in areas of activity
incidental or instrumental to their core profit-making activity.
A. THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN THE SUPREME COURT’S FIRST
AMENDMENT DECISIONS
i. Data and Coding
This subsection starts with all U.S. Supreme Court cases in
107
the Supreme Court Database (“SCD”), which ranges from 1946
to the present (n=12908 as of the date that the data were
downloaded, in December 2014). After dropping 68 records that
on inspection were duplicates or cases closely related to other
records, the resulting data set includes 423 unique Supreme Court
decisions involving speech, press or assembly under the First
108
Amendment. The cases were then coded for whether they
involved a business, an individual or some other kind of party
(usually a government entity), in what combination, and which
type of party won. Victories were distinguished between those in
which a party defeated an attempt to persuade the Court to strike
down a law or regulation under the First Amendment and those
in which a party succeeded in so persuading a Court to strike
109
down a law or regulation.
107. THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu (last visited March 21,
2015).
108. SCD codes cases in several ways, including a field called “Legal Provision
Supplement” (“Legal Supp” in the database itself). One case type within “Legal Supp” is
assigned the number 200 by SCD, and consists of cases involving “First Amendment
(speech, press and assembly)” (n=491).
109. For purposes of distinguishing businesses, individuals and other kinds of parties,
the following steps were taken. First, the SCD numerical codes for “petitioner” and
“respondent” were mapped into “business,” “individual” and “other,” in generally
straightforward ways. For example, any governmental entity or official was coded as
“other,” as were parties coded by SCD as universities, churches, public utility commissions,
eleemosynary institutions, public interest organizations, judges and unions. Parties coded
by SCD as corporations or businesses were coded as “business,” as were power companies,
telephone companies or utilities, banks, radio or television stations or networks, trade
organizations, shopping centers and restaurants. Parties coded by SCD as individuals were
coded as “individuals,” as were employees, aliens, authors, draftees, juveniles, political
candidates, private persons, protestors, racial minorities, journalists, and students. The
remaining categories were ambiguous. A significant subset consisted of expressive
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ii. Summary Statistics
Over the full period of the dataset, based on the above
classification, 63% of the cases involved at least one individual
party, and a slightly overlapping subset of 30% involving at least
one business party, with the remaining cases consisting of disputes
between other kinds of parties (e.g., university vs. government,
government official vs. government, etc.). The ratio of business to
individual First Amendment cases overall was 0.48.
Consistent with standard doctrinal histories and the review in
Part I.C, Virginia Pharmacy (1976) marks a clear shift in the data.
Prior to Virginia Pharmacy, businesses were involved in 26% of
the 176 cases, or 1.5 per year, while afterwards they were involved
in 34% of the 246 cases, or 2.2 per year. These increases for
business are statistically significant at a 95% level. These increases
are not due to an overall increase in First Amendment cases over
time – the overall linear time trend in the number of such cases is
almost zero. The increase in business cases remains significant
with linear time (annual) controls. The annual number of First
Amendment cases involving individuals actually decreased from
4.3 per year prior to Virginia Pharmacy to 3.6 per year after that
case. Both absolutely, and relative to individuals, business has
been involved in significantly more First Amendment cases to the
Supreme Court in the thirty-eight years since Virginia Pharmacy
than in the prior thirty-eight years.
The increase in First Amendment cases involving businesses
is depicted in Figure 2, which plots a five-year moving average of
the percentage of such cases as a share of the Supreme Court’s
First Amendment docket as a whole. Visual inspection reveals
four periods: the period prior to the 1950s, when business cases
were missing altogether; the period from the 1950s thorough the
early 1970s, when cases represented roughly 20% of the Court’s
First Amendment docket; the period from the mid-1970s through
the late 1980s, when such cases rose steeply and steadily before
leveling off at around 40% of the Court’s First Amendment
docket; and then the period since the late 1980s, during which they
have varied but represented a roughly stable share between 35%
and 40%. What constitutional law scholars will already have
businesses that could be operated by an individual or an incorporated entity: bookstores,
movie theatres, art exhibitors, newspapers, and publishers. These, as well as other
ambiguous party identities (for example, farmers, which included individuals and
agribusinesses) were classified based on a review of the specific captioned parties – if the
caption included “Incorporated,” “Corporation” or similar indicators of corporate status,
they were classified as “business,” and otherwise as “individual.”
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noted is that period 3—the period of rising First Amendment
cases involving businesses—coincides with the presence on the
Court of Justice Powell, who served from 1972 to 1987.

Figure 2. Source: Author calculations, http://scdb.wustl.edu

Business “win” rates also rose dramatically after Virginia
Pharmacy. Prior to that case, business won 20% of its First
Amendment cases, compared to a 41% win rate for individuals.
After Virginia Pharmacy, business and individual win rates were
roughly equivalent at 55% each. Again, the differences are robust
to overall time trends—while both kinds of parties won more
frequently, businesses won more frequently after Virginia
Pharmacy than can be accounted for by the overall increase alone,
while individuals’ victories are in line with the time trend.
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Business v. Individual "Win" Rates
First Amendment Cases
Pre- and Post-Virginia Pharmacy
Individual win

41%

Business win

55%

20%
0%

20%

55%

40%

Post-Virginia
Pharmacy
Pre-Virginia Pharmacy

60%

These changes over time in the role of business in First
Amendment cases is larger once the cases are analyzed to see if
business is seeking to use the First Amendment affirmatively, to
strike down a law or regulation, rather than defensively, to uphold
a law or regulation. In the 1940s, and a few times since then,
unions sought to have the Supreme Court strike down open shop
or anti-picketing laws as violating union members’ First
110
Business
Amendment rights—generally to no avail.
involvement in those cases was defensive—they were not seeking
to use the First Amendment to overturn legislation, but were
defending the outcome of the popular legislative process against
potential court intervention. Excluding defensive cases and
focusing solely on offensive uses of the First Amendment,
business cases and win rates fall by roughly a third in the preVirginia Pharmacy era, but not after.
A final point to make about the “offensive” First
Amendment cases prior to Virginia Pharmacy involving business
is that they almost always involved attacks on laws barring or
110. See, e.g., Lincoln Federal Labor Union et al. v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co. et al., 335
U.S. 525 (1949) (holding that open shop laws did not violate union members’ First
Amendment rights); Am. Fed’n Of Labor et al. v. American Sash & Door Co. et al., 335
U.S. 538 (1949) (same); Giboney et al. v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949)
(upholding anti-picketing law used against union under First Amendment); Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, Etc. Union, Local 309, et al. v. Hanke et al., d/b/a Atlas Auto Rebuild, 339 U.S.
470 (1950) (same); Bldg. Serv. Emps. International Union, Local 262, et al. v. Gazzam, 339
U.S. 532 (1950) (same); International Brotherhood pf Teamsters, Local 695, A.F.L., et al.
v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (same).
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restricting expressive businesses—i.e., the business of the business
party itself—whereas after Virginia Pharmacy they began
increasingly to involve attacks on laws regulating speech, such as
advertising, that was incidental or instrumental in the business of
the business party, brought by non-expressive businesses. The
first businesses to win First Amendment victories in the Supreme
Court illustrate typical expressive business cases. In Grosjean v.
111
American Press Co., the Court found the right to a free press
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause conflicted with a two percent gross receipts tax imposed
by Louisiana solely on individuals or corporations engaged in the
business of ad-based large-circulation newspapers, magazines or
similar publications, at the behest of Governor Huey Long, who
was generally understood to be retaliating against the newspapers
112
for being critical of his administration. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
113
Wilson, the Court found that a New York statute authorizing
the appointment by the Board of Regents of a head of the motion
picture division of New York State’s Board of Regents (which has
authority over education policy in the state) to examine motion
picture films and to issue licenses based on whether films were
“sacrilegious” was invalid as an unconstitutional abridgment of
free speech and of free press. The law challenged in this case
directly regulated the revenue-producing expression (in the form
of movies) of the business plaintiff, a for-profit film company.
Contrast these cases with the POM Wonderful case discussed
above, or another recent business victory—that of Western States
Medical Center et al. against provisions of the federal Food and
114
Drug Administration Modernization Act in 2002. In Western
States, the statute and regulations challenged did not regulate the
sale of the underlying drugs being sold by the business party, but
instead regulated the advertising and promotion of drugs. The
companies involved were not set up to engage in speech or other
forms of expression, but were using expression as an instrument,
to further the primary goals for which they were established, to
produce, distribute and sell drugs.

111. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
112. The Court in Grosjean adverts to this background when it notes that the “form
in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious,” being based not on advertising or
revenues but “the extent of the circulation of the publication, with the plain purpose of
penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers.”
297 U.S. at 251.
113. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
114. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center et al., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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The distinction between laws regulating expressive
businesses and laws regulating expression by non-expressive
businesses is an important one in understanding the patterns in
and social effects of post-World War II First Amendment
doctrine. Expressive business cases—those involving film
115
newspapers, 116 magazines, 117 book publishers,118
companies,
119
120
radio stations, theatre companies, and similar businesses—
often have fact patterns that are nearly identical to those involving
individuals, with the only difference being the nature of the party.
Individuals, by contrast, much less commonly bring cases
involving expression of commercial speech, even though there are
more sole proprietorships doing business in the U.S. than
corporate businesses, and the sole proprietorships are equally
121
More importantly,
subject to most business regulation.
expressive businesses brought all of the business victories under
the First Amendment prior to Virginia Pharmacy. No nonexpressive business – which is to say, no business not engaged in
expression for its primary revenue-producing activity—was able
to achieve an offensive First Amendment case prior to 1976. Put
differently, the era in which businesses have used the First
Amendment to achieve de- or re-regulatory goals beyond their
core revenue-producing activities falls entirely in, with increasing
frequency during, the last thirty years since the First
Amendment’s adoption in 1791.

115. Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
116. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan et al., 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This case also included
as petitioners the individuals who had taken out the ad claimed to be libelous, but it is
coded for present purposes as a “business” case because of the role of the newspaper itself.
Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233 (1936), an earlier First Amendment case involving newspaper
companies, predates the sample.
117. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
118. Bantam Books, Inc. et al. v. Sullivan et al., 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
119. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
120. Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968).
121. Commercial speech cases brought by individuals commonly involve
professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, all generally banned from using the
corporate form. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
(mandatory disclosures in attorney advertising); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447
(1978) (attorney advertising restrictions); King v. New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216 (3rd Cir.)
(2014) (professional counselors barred from seeking to change sexual orientation);
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (ban on in-person solicitation by certified public
accountants); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (ban on use of trade names by
optometrists).
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iii. Limits and Implications of Supreme Court Evidence
The analysis so far has limits. Because the dataset is
composed solely of Supreme Court cases, it runs up against
censoring or selection problems for both case type and outcome
data. These include the fact that the Supreme Court’s docket is
largely discretionary and small relative to the universe of disputes,
creating a challenge for interpreting data on both case type
incidence and case outcomes. For data on case type incidence, the
Court’s docket over time may not reflect the importance of legal
doctrines over time, if a doctrine had reasonably predicable
implications for disputes if litigated. For data on case outcomes,
the empirical challenge was flagged long ago context by Priest and
122
Klein —one should expect to see “win” rates for a given class of
cases near 50%, if litigants were rational and equally informed
and incentivized, because they would tend to settle as the odds of
123
victory moved away from 50%. Indeed, this is what we see for
the period after Virginia Pharmacy, where win rates for both
businesses and individuals are 55%, close enough to 50% given
the variance in the data to be consistent with the Priest-Klein
hypothesis.
What is empirically interesting is that there were enough
cases prior to Virginia Pharmacy in which businesses sought to use
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court took the case, but
where the Court declined to intervene, such that the win rate for
124
business was quite low, over a sustained period. One such case
125
was Citizen Publishing Co., where two businesses attempted to

122. George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
123. Cf. Jeff Yates, Damon M. Cann, & Brent D. Boyea, Judicial Ideology and the
Selection of Disputes for U.S. Supreme Court Adjudication, 10 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 847
(2013) (finding that about 56% of First Amendment cases favor the liberal party, and that
partisan ideology of Supreme Court Justices in First Amendment cases is strongest in cases
where deviation of case outcomes from 50% exceeds 5%).
124. These imply that the Priest-Klein hypothesis—which assumes equal incentives
for parties to pursue cases to a litigated decision (and here, through the difficult appeal up
to the Supreme Court)—may not always hold in the business context, where the profit
motive and large corporate resources may dramatically shift the willingness and ability of
businesses to pursue litigation beyond that a party-blind analysis would suggest would be
rational in a narrowly framed analysis of a single case. (Individuals may be strongly
motivated by both profit and ideology, but typically have fewer resources than business
corporations.) Indeed, one can rightly conceive of Virginia Pharmacy and Central
Hudson—and all of their progeny—as reflecting that same set of unusual incentives, in
which businesses have far more to gain from a sustained and programmatic effort to shift
First Amendment doctrine in their favor than a narrow cost-benefit analysis of any one
case would be true for an individual or less well-resourced and motivated litigant.
125. Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1970).
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argue that the Sherman and Clayton Acts were in conflict with the
First Amendment because they prohibited the use of joint
operating agreements between a city’s only two newspapers.
126
Quoting and affirming the 1945 case of Associated Press, the
Court held that:
It would strange indeed . . . if the grave concern for freedom of
the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment
should be read as a command that the government was without
power to protect that freedom.

This wisdom seems to have fallen out of the current Court’s
jurisprudence, in the same way that the guaranty of a Republican
form of government contained in Article IV of the U.S.
127
Constitution has faded from the public memory. Another failed
business effort to use the First Amendment against laws and
regulations from the pre-1976 era was California v. LaRue, in
which the Court upheld regulations of liquor licenses and dancers
at licensed bars, on the ground that it was not “irrational or
unreasonable” for a state to pass laws providing that the “sale of
liquor by the drink and lewd or naked entertainment should not
128
take place simultaneously.” Ongoing efforts by society to
confront the causes and consequences of violence against women
make what might have for a time seemed old-fashioned prudery
129
seem more reasonable than once was the case. Another
example of a failed business effort to use the First Amendment to
strike down regulation was Pittsburgh Press, in which the Court

126. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
127. That clause reads “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government.” Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849), is generally
thought to have—under the political question doctrine—essentially eliminated Article IV,
Section 4, Clause 1 from operative U.S. law. A neutral observer might wonder at the U.S.
Supreme Court essentially inventing ever-widening First Amendment grounds for
intervening in political questions, while refusing to consider a part of the U.S. Constitution
on the basis of a pre-Civil War case that was essentially repudiated by the addition of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, even when the neglected part of the
Constitution directly bears on modern decisions, including campaign finance cases such as
Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. et al. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. at 2490 (2012) (overturning a
Montana ban on direct corporate political expenditures out of general treasury funds).
128. 409 U.S. 109 (1973).
129. Interestingly, the Court has “disavowed” the reasoning in LaRue, but not the
holding, focusing instead on the LaRue opinion’s mistaken reliance on the Twenty-First
Amendment as giving states more power to regulate alcohol consumption in derogation of
other Constitutional rights, 44 Liquormart, Inc. et al. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996),
even as the Court in the same case built on Virginia Pharmacy to extend it to bans on
advertising alcohol prices.
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upheld a municipal ordinance banning newspapers from carrying
130
sex-based job advertisements.
B. THE ROLE OVER TIME OF CENTRAL HUDSON IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL
To address one limit of the foregoing analysis, this section
analyzes a different set of cases—those in the federal Courts of
Appeal. Unlike the Supreme Court, those courts do not have
substantial discretion over their docket, eliminating one source of
potential selection bias over the cases reported. (The other
source—litigant anticipation of case outcomes—remains, but
should not strongly affect incidence of mandatory appeals, which
is what is here analyzed.) The data for this section consists of all
cases decided in the Courts of Appeals found in Westlaw citing
Central Hudson, the leading case establishing the “commercial
speech” doctrine. After eliminating duplicates, the dataset
consists of 414 decisions, with some found in each of the Circuits:
from 21 in the Eighth Circuit and 25 in the D.C. Circuit to 77 in
the Ninth Circuit and 80 in the First Circuit.
The time trend revealed in the data is fairly straightforward:
it is up. A simple regression of cases on year of decision shows
that Central Hudson is being cited 0.21 more times every year, on
average, since 1980, and the time trend alone explains 31% of the
variation in case cites. The peak in the sample was 2012, when 20
decisions cited Central Hudson. The most recent year, 2014, saw
15 such decisions. The time trend is not perfectly linear—as shown
in Table 1, there are some fluctuations, with a decline in the early
‘90s, and another in the early ‘00s. But the overall trend is clearly
up, and not driven by any particular spike towards the end of the
period. In each of the fifteen years in the second half of the
sample, the number of cases citing Central Hudson exceeded the
average (nine) for the first half, and the average for the second
half was 44% higher (fourteen) than for the first half.
Consistent with the Supreme Court data presented below,
the growing role of Central Hudson in the Courts of Appeal
supports the view that businesses are growing steadily more
aggressive in their use of the First Amendment to pursue de- or
re-regulatory goals.

130.

413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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Table 1
Years
1980-84
1985-89
1990-94
1995-99
2000-04
2005-09
2010-14
Total

Court of Appeals Cases Citing
Central Hudson
50
48
44
67
55
71
79
414

One concern about interpreting the above data as showing a trend
towards more use of the First Amendment by businesses is that
one could imagine that Central Hudson—simply by articulating a
new test—stimulated more cases in which plaintiffs and lower
courts cited it, but without having much impact on the application
of the First Amendment to business regulation. The above
analysis partly rejects this idea—given that no case prior to
Virginia Pharmacy had struck down laws under the First
Amendment on behalf of non-expressive businesses. But one
might ask how the patterns of post-Central Hudson Courts of
Appeals citations compare to other novel, landmark cases under
the Bill of Rights. To consider this, a similar time-series was
131
constructed of Courts of Appeals cases citing (1) Mapp v. Ohio,
which first articulated the exclusionary rule permitting evidence
in violation of Fourth Amendment rights to be barred from
132
criminal trials, and (2) Roe v. Wade, which first articulated a
right to abortion. Each of those cases articulated a new ground for
bringing federal cases. The results of that analysis are presented
in Figure 3.

131.
132.

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).

COATES_FINAL DRAFT III (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

7/8/2015 10:50 AM

CORPORATE SPEECH

Figure 3. Sources: Author calculations, Westlaw

259

COATES_FINAL DRAFT III (DO NOT DELETE)

260

7/8/2015 10:50 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:223

As can be seen, the pattern of Courts of Appeals cases citing
Mapp spike in the half-dozen years afterwards, and then fall off
significantly, before leveling off at a relatively low level, with an
overall trend line sloping down over the period since the decision.
Cases following Roe are similar, with an even steeper decline over
the entire time since the decision, and no durable resurgence in
the 1990s and 2000s. The case pattern for Central Hudson is
distinct. Instead of falling off, the numbers of Courts of Appeal
cases have increased since 1980, with some annual ups and downs,
but a clear overall trend upwards. Compared to Mapp and Roe,
Central Hudson created a sufficiently malleable tool for litigants
that they have continued to generate ever more contested cases at
the appellate court level over time. Of course, these numbers do
not tell us anything about the nature of the cases, so it possible
that the increase in cases under Central Hudson is not
substantively meaningful, and does not reflect successful
challenges to regulations by businesses. To assess the decision’s
substantive impact, we need to examine the specifics of a sample
of current business cases under the First Amendment.
C. THE CURRENT ROLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE
COURTS OF APPEAL
To better understand the cross-section of current commercial
speech cases, each of the decisions citing Central Hudson decided
in 2014 was reviewed to identify the nature of the litigants, theory
of the case, and case outcome. Table 2 summarizes.
Table 2 (Federal Courts of Appeals Cases Citing Central Hudson in 2014)
Case
Citation
Plaintiff
Defendant
Type
Type

Outcome

Safelite Group, Inc. v.
Jepsen
King v. New Jersey

764 F.3d 258 (2nd
Cir.)
767 F.3d 216 (3rd
Cir.)

Business

Government

Business win

Individual

Government

Individual
loss

Heffner v. Murphy

745 F.3d 56 (3rd
Cir.)

Business

Government

Business win

1-800-411-Pain
Referral Serv., LLC
v. Otto
Dwyer v. Cappell

744 F.3d 1045 (8th
Cir.)

Business

Government

Business loss

762 F.3d 275 (3rd
Cir.)

Business

Government

Business win

Liberty Coins, LLC v.
Goodan

748 F.3d 682 (6th
Cir.)

Business

Government

Business loss
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Hucul Adver., LLC v.
Charter Twp. of
Gaines

748 F.3d 273 (6th
Cir.)

Business

Government

Business loss

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.
v. Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n

748 F.3d 359 (D.C.
Cir.),
vac.
in
rehearing en banc
2014 WL 2619836

Business

Government

Business win

Am. Meat Inst. v.
U.S. Dept. of Agric.

746 F.3d 1065 (D.C.
Cir.),
vac.
in
rehearing en banc
2014 WL 2619836

Business

Government

Business loss

Van Wagner Boston,
LLC v. Davey

770 F.3d 33 (1st
Cir.)

Business

Government

Business win

Evergreen Ass’n, Inc.
v. City of New York

740 F.3d 233 (2nd
Cir.)

Individual

Government

Individual
win

Tyler v. Hillsdale Co.
Sheriff’s Dept.

775 F.3d 308 (6th
Cir.)

Individual

Government

Individual
win

Jordan v. Jewel Food
Stores, Inc.

743 F.3d 509 (7th
Cir.)

Individual

Business

Business loss

Wollschlaeger
Florida

760 F.3d 1195 (11th
Cir.)

Individual

Government

Mixed
outcome

v.

Business achieved a 50% win-rate (five of ten) in these
133
cases. Consistent with the analysis above, most of these cases
are not brought by expressive businesses—not newspaper
companies or book publishers or the like—but by a range of
ordinary corporations, in a range of ordinary businesses,
challenging a range of ordinary regulations not targeted at speech
generally, but either requiring disclosures or regulating specific
speech acts (such as the content of sales pitches, trade names, and
radio ads) that were incidental to the businesses in question. In
Safelite Group, the plaintiff was a insurance claim manager,
unhappy about an anti-tying not allowing the business to
contractually require insureds to use, or steer them towards, an

133. The fact that business is over-represented in these cases relative to the Supreme
Court cases above is not surprising, since these cases are all citing Central Hudson, which
articulated the commercial speech doctrine. In King, that doctrine was extended to
individual professionals seeking to speak in their professional capacities, but the individual
plaintiff involved lost despite the application of the doctrine. In Tyler and Wollschlaeger,
the case was cited by analogy, and not applied to the facts of the case. In Jordan, the
business asserted the doctrine as a defense to a series of claims brought by Michael Jordan.
In Evergreen Ass’n, the government defendant attempted to argue that the case was a
commercial speech case, and lost that argument.
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affiliated service company; 134 in Heffner, plaintiffs included
funeral services companies, who wanted to be able to operate
under trade names that did not include the name of a current or
135
former funeral director; in Otto, it was a medical services
referral provider seeking to use actors in TV ads purporting to
depict former customers and to claim in radio spots that injured
136
victims “may be entitled to up to forty thousand dollars.” In
American Meat and National Association of Manufacturers, the
plaintiffs were industrial company trade groups hoping to avoid
137
and disclosure
“country-of-origin” labeling requirements
138
requirements concerning their purchase of “conflict minerals,”
respectively. The only expressive business-plaintiff in these cases
was Van Wagner Boston, LLC, an outdoor advertising company.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS:
CORPORATIONS, INDIVIDUALS, AND OWNERSHIP
The foregoing historical empirical analyses found that (a) the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment docket did not include
business plaintiffs at all until roughly 150 years after the First
Amendment was adopted, and long after business had produced
the giant gains in wealth and welfare that have made capitalism
the dominant form of economic activity in the world; (b) until the
mid-1970s, only expressive businesses challenging laws that
directly impeded their core business were able to convince the
Court to strike down laws on their behalf, and not other
businesses seeking to achieve de- or re-regulatory goals generally;
(c) after the burst of judicial activism under the influence of
Justice Powell in the mid-1970s, First Amendment cases in which
businesses are the primary beneficiary have increasingly displaced
cases in which individuals are the primary beneficiary; (d) the
Central Hudson doctrine has encouraged an increasing number of
commercial speech cases to be brought over time, and, in line with
the Priest-Klein hypothesis, the private litigants are generally
making accurate predictions in their case selection, leading to
business wins in about 50% of the cases appealed to the Courts of
Appeal; and (e) cases currently being decided in the Courts of
Appeal under Central Hudson mostly do not involve expressive
businesses, but are attacks on laws and regulations that inhibit
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

764 F.3d 258, at 259–61.
745 F.3d at 88–89.
744 F.3d at 1051–53.
746 F.3d at 1065–66.
748 F.3d at 363–65.
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“speech” by other kinds of businesses in areas of activity
incidental or instrumental to their core profit-making activity.
These findings present a challenge to the view, articulated by
the majority and concurrences in Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby, that corporations and other business entities should be
understood “simply” as aggregations or associations of
individuals, and so should not be distinguished from them for
purposes of First Amendment analysis. It is true that corporations
are given life and meaning only because of individuals, but the
identities, roles and powers of individuals associated with
corporations vary enormously. As a result, the influence of
different individuals associated with corporations on the legal
decisions of those corporations, and the effects of those decisions
on individuals associated with corporations, also varies
enormously, across types of corporations.
At one extreme, a single-owner corporation with no
employees is nothing more than a form of property for that one
individual. The individual does not typically need the corporation
to pursue the individual’s interests in free expression—they can
do so directly. Even if the corporation so owned has property
needed to defend constitutional rights, that property can be
removed easily from the corporation and used by the individual.
For the millions of sole proprietorships organized for legal
purposes in this way, there is simply no legitimate need (albeit
little harm) in granting First Amendment rights to such entities.
At the other extreme, a multiple-owner corporation with
thousands of employees may be viewed as the association of the
owners, of the employees, or both. In typical, large, publicly held
U.S. companies, the ones with the most money and resources, it is
neither owners nor employees that are legally empowered to act
on behalf of the company, or to choose its business strategies or
litigation tactics. The individuals with that power comprise the
board of directors, typically fewer than fifteen in number,
nominally elected by the shareholders, but in fact largely selfperpetuating. In fact, even the board rarely chooses business
strategy and almost never chooses litigation tactics in practice, but
delegates those tasks to a small number of senior managers,
subject only to loose oversight, consisting of six to twelve board
meetings per year, at which the information the board has is
largely produced by the managers they oversee.
However one evaluates these facts, they are facts, with
implications for how to think about the corporate takeover of the
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First Amendment. While any corporate challenge to a law or
regulation under the First Amendment necessarily involves some
human individual, that individual is not necessarily one with
legitimate authority or social interests in the strategy or tactics
involved in the challenge. For example, at the time that IMS
139
Health Inc. initiated the lawsuit that led to the Sorrell decision
in 2011, it was a publicly traded company, with thousands of
140
shareholders, and thousands of employees. No individual
owned more than 3% of its shares – indeed, all of its directors and
141
officers combined owned less than 3% of its shares. It had four
institutional shareholders with more than 5% of its shares, each,
but each of those institutions held on behalf of thousands of
142
individual beneficiaries.
As a result, the decision to sue the Vermont Attorney
General to strike down the privacy laws attacked in that case was
not made by (or with the consent or even knowledge) of any of
those employees or owners, other than (possibly) the senior
management and (likely) a relatively small number of employees
in the business unit interested in exploiting customer data and in
the legal department. The bulk of the owners, and in all likelihood
most of the employees, were not asked or informed about
whether they or IMS Healthcare, Inc. had a meaningful First
Amendment interest in “speaking” about the prescribing
practices of individual doctors based on private patient data that
the company had obtained. In fact, the majority of owners or
employees living in Vermont had an interest in the prevention of
“speech” of that kind, assuming ordinary assumptions about
representative democracy reflecting the “median voter” were
valid. Nor in fact did any individual have such an interest—the
individuals in the relevant business unit and the individuals

139. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
140. IMS Health Incorporated, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 10, 22, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar
/data/1058083/000104746910000961/a2196431z10-k.htm (disclosing over 7,000 employees
and over 3,000 record holders). Record holders include brokers and banks that typically
hold on behalf of more numerous beneficial owners, which in turn may be institutions (for
example, mutual funds) that hold on behalf of still more numerous individuals. John C.
Coates IV, The Powerful and Pervasive Effect of Ownership on M&A (Harvard Law and
Economics Discussion Paper No. 669, June 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1544500.
141. IMS Health Inc. 2010 Proxy Statement at 5-7, available at http://tinyurl.com
/osegjb6.
142. Id. (listing Barclays, Arial Capital, FMR, and Wellington as block holders). Each
of those institutions is a well-known money management firm investing money on behalf
of their own investor-clients.
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managing the corporation only had an interest in earning a profit
in the least regulated way possible, and the company’s interests in
“expression” (of private prescribing practice data!) were
instrumental and linked to their individual interests only through
their profit motive.
In sum, the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sorrell—as in most of the First Amendment business cases since
Virginia Pharmacy—was not to vindicate the expressive interests
of any individual associated with IMS Health Inc., but simply to
make it easier for that company, as a business organization, to
make money, at the expense of the privacy of Vermont residents.
The result was, in essence, to transfer power to set regulatory
policy from the Vermont government to the Court. The transfer
was achieved at the behest of a small group of individuals,
managers and employees of a single company. These managers
and employees were never asked or expected by the organizers or
owners of the company to use that power in such a fashion. Put
differently, the corporate takeover of the First Amendment
represents a pure redistribution of power over law with no
efficiency gain – “rent seeking” in economic jargon. That power
is taken from ordinary individuals with identities and interests as
voters, owners and employees, and transferred to corporate
bureaucrats pursuing narrowly framed goals with other people’s
money. This is as radical a break from Anglo-American business
and legal traditions as one could find in U.S. history.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TAKEOVER
TO THE NEW CORRUPTION
In this final Part III, I cash out the historical and empirical
analysis in Parts I and II by sketching the consequences of the
corporate takeover of the First Amendment. I first try to define
what is at stake—a specific form of legal corruption that is distinct
but has analogues to forms of corruption that can be found in
history. I then argue that the corruption represented by the
ongoing corporate takeover of the First Amendment, if it persists,
not only risks the loss of a republican form of government
emphasized by most critics of Citizens United, but the risk of an
extended era of economic malaise—a package of risks that one
might call (with only some exaggeration) “the risk of Russia.”
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A. WHAT IS CORRUPTION?
Definitions of “corruption” vary. Corruption is a “derivative
concept,” one that needs to be linked to both a specific noun
(institution, person, object) and a normative theory of how that
143
noun ought to be, against which corruption can be measured.
Corruption is the negative of health. For complex systems such as
democracy and capitalism, ill health can arise from a wide number
of causes. It follows that—for an institution or a system—efforts
to improve health—to combat corruption—can take a wide
number of forms.
In ordinary conversation, multiplicity of meanings may lead
to confusion but also to discussion and clarification. But legal
concepts in operation need to be more specific and simple—else
they are difficult to predict and apply, and at the margin,
meaningless and manipulable. This was one arguably legitimate
reason that in Citizens United, the Supreme Court overturned its
precedents and narrowed the legal meaning of corruption to
consist solely of “quid pro quo” corruption—i.e., bribery of
government officials—the exchange of something of value for a
144
specific governmental act. As a result of the Court’s narrow
definition, campaign finance laws that have the purpose of
reducing corruption understood more broadly are, in the Court
majority’s view, unjustified, and so fail under the First
Amendment, even if evaluated under the nominally lighter
“commercial speech” doctrine, which as noted above, requires a
“substantial purpose” to be served “directly” by laws abridging
145
such speech.
The Court’s narrowing is not the only way to give the concept
of corruption enough specificity to have legal meaning, as
143. Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1385 (2013). Others have made similar points. See, e.g., Dennis F.
Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1038 (2005) (“The form the virus [corruption] takes depends on the
form of government it attacks. In regimes of a more popular cast, such as republics and
democracies…[t]he essence of corruption…is the pollution of the public by the private.”);
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 373 (2009)
(“Corruption . . . has two meanings . . . . It has a broad meaning, describing all kinds of
moral decay, and a more specific meaning in the context of politics.”); Samuel Issacharoff,
On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 126 (2010) (“Any constitutional test
resting on corruption as the evil to be avoided begs for a definition of the good, or, in this
case, the uncorrupted.”).
144. 130 S. Ct. at 908–11; Heather Gerken, Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance,
27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1157–58 (2011) (Citizens United “substantially narrowed the
definition of corruption”).
145. See text accompanying supra notes 85–93.
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illustrated by the Court’s own analysis. “The fact that speakers
may have influence over or access to elected officials,” Justice
Kennedy wrote, “does not mean that these officials are corrupt,”
146
and “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption.” In one of
the more astonishing sections of any Supreme Court opinion ever
written, Kennedy acknowledges:
If elected officials succumb to improper influences from
independent expenditures; if they surrender their best
judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then
surely there is cause for concern.

From this sensible sentence, he reverts to catechism: “it is our
law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing
rule,” and “bans on speech that are asymmetrical to preventing
quid pro quo corruption” are unconstitutional. In sum, to
Kennedy and the Court majority, corruption as a legal concept
excludes “influence,” “ingratiation,” and even “improper
147
influences.” Excluding these moderately broader conceptions of
corruption from its legal meaning was not necessary to limit the
potential reach of laws justified by corruption. One is put in mind
of Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty when he said, “in a rather
scornful tone” that “‘When I use a word . . . it means just what I
148
choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’”
Commentators have criticized the Court’s radically narrowed
definition as too narrow, and have offered their own, broader
definitions. Zephyr Teachout draws on the ideological history of
early U.S. history to argue that corruption, as understood at that
time, involved “excessive private interests influencing the exercise
149
of public power.” Larry Lessig argues that the best conception
of corruption is a type of dependency of an agent or institution on
some one or group other than the principal or intended
beneficiary of the institution, such that the effectiveness of the
150
agent or institution is impaired. Richard Hasen advances “rentseeking” as a new and broader understanding of corruption that
146.
147.
148.

130 S. Ct. at 908–11 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND
THERE 123 (Henry Altemus 1897) (1871).
149. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 9, 38, 276 (2014). Teachout
notes that corruption was cited more often in the U.S. Constitutional convention than
“factions, violence, or instability,” that it was discussed on more than a quarter of the
convention’s days, and that Madison recorded the use of the word 54 times. See Zephyr
Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 352–53 (2009).
150. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS AND
A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011).
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could justify laws governing lobbying consistent with the First
151
Sam Issacharoff advances a conception of
Amendment.
corruption in which “the threat to democratic governance may
come from the emergence of a ‘clientelist’ relation between
elected officials and those who seek to profit from relations to the
152
state.” No doubt others could be advanced.
Each of these definitions has appeal, and they obviously
overlap. Each is consistent with a recent synthesis of research in
political science on what stock market reactions to various events
tell us about how corporations achieve political influence: “trust
relationships are necessary to support potential corrupt practices
and . . . cronyism based such relationships is a more prevalent
practice than quid pro quo exchanges of money for political
153
favors.” Each of these broader conceptions of corruption
represents a vision of how to restore legal meaning to the
legitimate goals of campaign finance reform.
B. THE RISK OF RUSSIA
Here, however, I want to argue that the corporate takeover
of the First Amendment is a large part of an emerging form of
corruption not solely of American government, but also of an
institution that has been at least as important to America’s
history—its “free enterprise” system, consisting of free market
capitalism constrained by law. Others have emphasized the way
154
that corporate speech “trumps” based on the First Amendment
155
risks corrupting the American political system, which is no
doubt true. Instead, I want to emphasize that the existence and
power of those same trumps can also and as importantly corrupt
the economic system. If an economically healthy but politically

151. Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 191 (2012).
152. Issacharoff, supra note 143, at 121.
153. Jeff Milyo, Corporate Influence and Political Corruption: Lessons from Stock
Market Reactions to Political Events (University of Missouri Dept. of Economics, Working
Paper, 2013), available at http://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2013/WP1323_
milyo.pdf.
154. A note on rhetoric: First Amendment legal entitlements are generally called
“rights” when applied to individuals, but are more properly conceived as “trumps” when
applied to businesses. Individuals assert the “right” to speak as an end in itself; businesses
(other than expressive businesses) use equivalent legal entitlements as an instrumental
means to another goal, that of profits or economic rents. For more on “rents,” see text
accompanying notes 147-54 supra.
155. See Teachout, supra note 143; Lessig, supra note 150; Laurence H. Tribe,
Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. the Controversy, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 491–92
(2015).
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closed system is bad, a country like Russia that combines both
despotism and economic malaise is worse. Both are risks of the
corporate takeover of the First Amendment.
The corporate takeover of the First Amendment is at its
heart the use by elite members of society of specific legal tools to
156
degrade the rule of law. These tools are those sketched in
operation in Part I.C and Part II: the increasing and broadening
use by corporations of challenges under the First Amendment to
laws and regulations generally, and especially and increasingly
laws that do not constrain expressive businesses (such as media
companies), but any communicative or expressive activity of any
business, no matter how incidental to the purpose and goals of the
business, and no matter how little any ordinary individual (even a
shareholder or employee of the business) might care about the
expression in question. Concentrated, moneyed interests,
represented by those in control of the country’s largest business
corporations, are increasingly able to turn law into a lottery,
reducing law’s predictability, impairing property rights, and
increasing the share of the economy devoted to rent-seeking
rather than productive activity.
Companies are increasingly able to persuade courts—not all
of them, all of the time, but enough of them, enough of the time—
to exploit the “fit” requirement of the Central Hudson test to
achieve de- or re-regulatory goals not obtainable through the
political process, as corrupt as that is becoming. The result is not
simply de- or re-regulation, moreover—not simply a New
157
Lochnerism, though it is that, too. Rather, the result also
156. By “rule of law” I have in mind conventional understandings, such as that agreedupon by H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, despite their disagreements on other points, in which
laws are general, published, prospective, clear, understandable, free from contradictions,
not changed too frequently, and congruent with authorized or official action. H.L.A.
HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 347 (1983); LON L. FULLER THE
MORALITY OF LAW 145 (1969); cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971) (“A
legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the
purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the framework for social cooperation.”),
which, as Peggy Radin has shown, can be viewed as similar to if also substantively different
from the Fuller/Hart definition, in Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law,
69 B.U. L. REV. 781,787–88 (1989), with the essential test being whether a dictatorship
could be viewed as adhering to the rule of law.
157. For others noting the similarity between the use of the First Amendment to
achieve de- and re-regulatory goals and the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to do the
same in the Lochner era, see, for example, Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of
Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583 (2008); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal
Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195
(2015); Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2015).
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undermines the rule of law more generally. Precedents are
158
stare decisis becomes a joke; 159 constitutional
overturned;
entrepreneurialism runs amok. Radicals in pinstriped suits rewrite
whole elements of long-established legal order. Under First
Amendment threat, laws become quantum objects—partly there,
partly not there. As a system, they cease to have several of the key
indicia of the “rule of law,” including consistency, predictability,
160
and publicity.
Companies created to take business risks with enormous
resources, derived from dispersed and hence rationally apathetic
owners, increasingly place bets not on new technologies or
marketing strategies, but on legal and political “innovation”—
what in business schools is taught under the Orwellian name
161
“non-market strategies.” Consistent with the 1971 Powell
162
163
memo, government affairs offices grow, and strategic planning
generates decision trees down many branches of which a friendly
panel of the D.C. Circuit overturns regulations, should an agency
164
dare to enforce them. Agencies risk resources, demoralization,
165
and loss of reputation and status when they lose these battles.
They trim their sails, and reduce their enforcement efforts.
Knowing that they have a hard time enforcing the laws they have,
166
agencies also reduce their regulatory activity, and ignore (or at
158. Virginia Pharmacy overturned Valentine; Bellotti was inconsistent with UAWCIO and Pipefitters; Citizens United overturned Austin and McConnell.
159. Adam Liptak, Thomas is Getting a New Chance to Break Precedent (if Not
Silence), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2014, at A15 (“‘You are the justice who is most willing to reexamine the court’s precedents,’ Judge Diane S. Sykes told [Justice Thomas] in November,
at an annual dinner sponsored by the Federalist Society, the conservative legal group.
Justice Thomas responded . . . ‘That’s because of my affinity for stare decisis,’ he said . . .
Then he let out a guffaw.’”).
160. See supra note 144.
161. See, e.g., MGMT-450 Strategic Management in Non-market Environments,
KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT (course overview describing course on “nonmarket strategies” including use of “legislatures, regulatory bodies, or courts”), available
at http://tinyurl.com/oht5cwv (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
162. See supra note 82.
163. JOHN P. HEINZ, EDWARD O. LAUMANN, ROBERT L. NELSON & ROBERT
SAINTSBURY, THE HOLLOW CORE (1993).
164. See, e.g., John M. de Figueiredo & Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., The Allocation of
Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulaton, 4 BUS.
& POLITICS 161 (2002).
165. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, in
THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 88 (MARC K. LANDY & MARTIN A. LEVIN EDS.,
1995) (explaining that litigation drains agency resources, causing agencies to alter their
behavior in an effort to avoid it).
166. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case
Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 1, 913–26 (2015) (describing delays and effects of
litigation challenging securities regulations); Kagan, supra note 165; Bruce Kraus &
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least impose long delays on implementing) directives from
Congress.
With the degradation of the rule of law come economic
consequences. The rule of law—including stability in law and
regulation—is essential to secure property rights, and
“[e]conomists from Adam Smith (1776) to Douglas C. North
(1981) agree that poor protection of property rights is bad for
167
growth.” Efforts to use of the First Amendment by corporations
to achieve non-expressive ends commonly represent what
168
economists call “rent seeking,” or in more legal language,
socially wasteful transfers, or in ordinary language, theft, waste
and graft. When successful, rent seeking transfers wealth from
one person to another, but more importantly, it represents a net
wasteful investment in overall welfare, since one person’s gain is
another’s loss, and the exercise of transferring wealth requires
169
resources.
As with corruption, the concept of rent seeking has multiple
potential meanings, and however defined is not a simple, uniform
170
set of behaviors. Rent seeking can take different forms in
different contexts, and flow in multiple directions. In classic public
choice narratives, rent seeking is all about the use by government
Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. REG. 289,
342 (2013) (“Cost-benefit litigation has substantially slowed the pace of financial
reform.”).
167. Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Why Is Rent Seeking So
Costly to Growth?, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers and Proceedings 409 (1993), available at
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/rent_seeking.pdf; see also Noel D. Johnson,
Courtney L. LaFountain & Steve Yamarik, Corruption is Bad for Growth (Even in the
United States), 147 PUB. CHOICE 377 (2011); Ignacio Del Rosal, The Empirical
Measurement of Rent-Seeking Costs, 25.2 J. ECON. SURVEYS 298 (2011); Russell S. Sobel
& Thomas A. Garrett, On the Measurement of Rent Seeking and Its Social Opportunity
Cost, 112 PUB. CHOICE 115 (2002).
168. For a standard if ideologically tinged articulations of the concept of rent seeking,
see Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 506, 506
(Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (“Rent seeking is the socially costly pursuit of wealth
transfers.”).
169. As noted by Hasen, supra note 151 at n.232 (citing Charles Anderton, Teaching
Arms-Race Concepts in Intermediate Microeconomics, 21 J. ECON. EDU. 148, 158–59 (1990)
(“On occasion, lobbying activities to defeat earlier-imposed rent-seeking legislation could
in isolation be efficient. For example, a lobbyist may successfully get the government to
remove a protective tariff. Overall, however, a culture of fighting over transfers is likely to
be inefficient, akin to the usual inefficiencies of arms races.”).
170. Paul Dragos Aligica and Vlad Tarko distinguish several types of rent-seeking
societies in history before arguing that “crony capitalism” represents a new type of society.
Crony Capitalism: Rent Seeking, Institutions and Ideology, 67 KYKLOS 156, 157 (2014)
(“Crony capitalism is yet another type of rent-seeking society, distinct of those three, and
that its key distinguishing feature is that the prevailing rent-seeking structure is legitimized
by means of a populist ideology.”).

COATES_FINAL DRAFT III (DO NOT DELETE)

272

7/8/2015 10:50 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:223

officials of power to award monopolies or bar entry to new
businesses unless bribes are paid. In development economics, it
often represents simple bribes for subsidies, grants, underpriced
loans, or tax breaks. It can involve simple information advantages,
which may permit insider trading or the equivalent in nonsecurities markets.
Less well appreciated is that rent seeking can also occur
through the courts. It can represent bribes to judges to rule in
favor of bribe-payers in disputes, or a flow of benefits—speaking
fees, status-enhancing social invitations, non-monetary benefits
such as free travel—in return for advancing a broad-scale legal
ideology that will produce systematic benefits to the rent-seekers
over time. Corporate managers can seek rents from the
government to benefit their shareholders, government officials
can seek to extract rents from corporations, and corporate
managers can seek rents from shareholders, too (generally
understood as a form of “agency costs” in the economic and lawand-economics literatures), and use corporate political activity to
171
advance their personal goals.
171. For evidence on corporate political activity generally being associated with
corporate agency costs, see Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Corporate Political Donations:
Investment or Agency?, 14 BUSINESS AND POLITICS (2012) (explaining that political
activity public companies spent less on R&D and political donations correlated negatively
with long-term firm-specific stock performance); Coates, supra note 5 (stating that
corporate political activity leads to higher incidence of corporate CEOs becoming high
government officials, and is correlated with and partly results in lower corporate value);
Holly Brasher & David Lowery, The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity, 8 BUSINESS
AND POLITICS (2006) (explaining that public companies, with dispersed owners, more
likely to lobby than otherwise similar private companies, with concentrated owners); Paul
K. Chaney, Mara Faccio & David Parsley, The Quality of Accounting Information in
Politically Connected Firms, 51 J. ACC’T & ECON. 58 (2011) (finding that earnings quality
of politically connected firms is significantly poorer than those not politically connected);
Mara Faccio, Differences Between Politically Connected and Non-Connected Firms: A
Cross-Country Analysis, 39 FIN. MGT. 905 (2010) (arguing that politically connected firms
have higher leverage and market shares but underperform relative to non-connected
firms); Mara Faccio, Ronald W. Masulis & John J. McConnell, Political Connections and
Corporate Bailouts, 56 J. FIN. 2597 (2006) (discussing that politically connected firms and
more likely to need and obtain bailouts and perform worse than non-connected companies,
including those that also obtained bailouts); Michael Hadani & D. Schuler, In Search of El
Dorado: The Elusive Financial Returns on Corporate Political Investments, 34 STR. MGT.
J. 165 (2013) (political investments by public companies are negatively associated with
market performance); Russell Sobel & Rachel Graefe-Anderson, The Relationship
Between Political Connections and the Financial Performance of Industries and Firms,
(George Mason University Mercatus Center, Working Paper No. 14-18, 2014), available at
http://mercatus.org/publication/relationship-between-political-connections-and-financialperformance-industries-firms (“We find little evidence to support the idea that political
activity undertaken by corporations leads to improved performance for firms and their
shareholders at both the industry and firm level. We do however find a robust and
significant positive relationship between political activity and executive compensation.”);
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As corporate activity becomes enmeshed in any or all of
these types of rent seeking, they lose strategic focus on other,
socially beneficial methods to make a profit: to innovate, to
deliver goods and services efficiently, to pursue efficient costcutting, to seek synergistic combinations of assets. Once corporate
success depends on rent seeking, advancement within the
corporation will depend on learning the levers of power in courts,
legislators, and regulatory agencies, and different skills and forms
of human capital will be rewarded. Rent seeking crowds out
economically valuable activity, attracts investment and “talent,”
172
and shapes careers. Businesses become increasingly aimed at
exploiting market imperfections that conventional laws and
regulations are meant to address. “An increase in rent seeking
activity may make rent seeking more (rather than less) attractive
173
relative to productive activity.” Real investment returns fall,
faced with the risk of such exploitation. When, for example,
consumers pay over $100 million per year for pomegranate juice,
in substantial part because a company has convinced consumers
that the juice reduces cholesterol, promotes a healthy heart and
prostate, and slows tumor growth, when a government agency
attempts to force the seller to prove the health claims in the same
way that a drug company would have to do, only to have a court
strike the requirement down under Central Hudson, the result is
a waste of social resources, on multiple levels, with multiplier
effects as others observe the result, and respond accordingly.
At the end of the rent-seeking road is Russia, blessed with
natural resources but neither democracy nor the rule of law nor
sustained economic growth. I concede that Russia’s history is
Frank Yu & Ziaoyun Yu, Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection, 46 J. FIN’L & QUANT.
ANAL. 1865 (2011) (discussing that public firms engaged in lobbying and fraud are less
likely than those not engaged in lobbying to be detected as fraudulent, and evade fraud
detection for longer, allowing managers more time to sell shares and leading to greater
misallocation of resources during fraudulent periods).
172. Others have advanced this point about campaign finance regulation. See e.g.,
Hasen, supra note 151; Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion,
and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1112–13, 1124–25
(2002) (arguing that anti-rent-seeking was one of the goals of the Progressive-era
restrictions on corporate political activity, noting that the corporate form “provides a
simple way to channel rents to only those who have paid their dues, as it were. If you do
not own stock, you do not benefit from the larger dividends or appreciation in the stock
price caused by the passage of private interest legislation”); Edward Glaeser et al., The
Injustice of Inequality, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 199 (2003). To my knowledge, however, no
one has connected the harms of rent-seeking to the broader corporate takeover of the First
Amendment—which includes the campaign finance cases involving corporate activity, but
extends to many other kinds of deregulatory uses of the First Amendment.
173. Murphy et al., supra note 167.
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among its burdens, that the U.S. has robust republican traditions
on which it can draw, and that the U.S. will not resemble Russia
anytime in the near future. But it is precisely the force of history
that creates worries about the path we are on, and whether it
points towards anything like Russia. How far down that road we
have already traveled is a good question. Some might argue that
we have already moved some way down that road, pointing to the
recent financial crisis and recession, which was caused in part by
the deregulation of the financial industry over the past thirty
years, including through litigation or threat of litigation.
Pessimists might also suggest that the repeated non-compliance
by the country’s largest banks with basic laws and regulations, the
increased participation in party politics by trade groups and public
companies, and the evident fact that the tax system has failed to
accomplish the goal of fairly distributing the burdens of citizens
based on its benefits. Pessimists might also note that in some
models of the political economy, rent seeking can tip affairs from
174
a healthy to an unhealthy equilibrium in a rapid fashion. More
optimistic observers might argue that the rule of law tends to have
an inertial power, and so to be resilient, and that the U.S.
economy remains the strongest in the world, despite (or even
because of) the past thirty years of legal change. Such judgments
are contestable, unlikely to be resolved at such a high level of
generality. The risks associated with a degraded rule of law, the
risks of moving towards Russia, however, seem uncontestable.
The risks of Russia are the risks that structural constraints on
private corporate power—illustrated in the business history
outlined at the outset of this Article—were meant to address.
Heavy controls on corporate entities trying to move outside the
business of business and into government activity date back to the
Stuart period in England. The implementation of public finance
was wrested away from the King by Parliament, a shift reflected
in the U.S. in the vesting of the power to tax and spend in
Congress. Monetary powers were hived off with the emergence of
the Bank of England, eventually reflected in the U.S. in the
Federal Reserve’s unique separation from private business and
ordinary politics alike. A government monopoly over the creation
and governance of multi-owner private legal entities was adopted
in the Bubble Act, as eventually reflected in the U.S. in the
effectively centralized powers in the Securities and Exchange
Commission, with its authority over the New York Stock
174.

See, e.g., id.
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Exchange, and, with the characteristic quirkiness of American
federalism, in the Delaware courts. Commerce and banking were
separated, by custom in the U.K. and in the U.S. by law—the
National Bank Act and the Bank Holding Company Act.
Corporate economic power in the U.S. was further cabined by the
Sherman Act, the Tillman Act, and the Hatch Act. Each of these
structural constraints and controls emerged long before the
Supreme Court invented an activist First Amendment
jurisprudence, much less before that jurisprudence was extended
to businesses or, still later, commercial speech. These structural
constraints can best be understood as preserving room for free
enterprise activity separate from the affairs of government—at
securing the economic benefits of growth by insuring that “we are
all servants of the laws, for the very purpose of being able to be
175
[free].” Let us see that they survive the corporate takeover of
the First Amendment.

175.

THE ORATIONS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 164 (C.D. Yonge trans., 1867)

